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In the sixth year of its civil war, Syria is a shattered nation, broken into political, religious, and ethnic fragments. Most of
the population remains under the control of President Bashar al-Assad, whose Russian- and Iranian-backed Baʻath Party
government controls the major cities and the lion’s share of the country’s densely populated coastal and central-western
areas.
Since the Russian military intervention that began in September 2015, Assad’s Syrian Arab Army and its Shia Islamist
allies have seized ground from Sunni Arab rebel factions, many of which receive support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Turkey, or the United States. The government now appears to be consolidating its hold on key areas.
Media attention has focused on the siege of rebel-held Eastern Aleppo, which began in summer 2016, and its reconquest
by government forces in December 2016.  The rebel enclave began to crumble in November 2016. Losing its stronghold
in Aleppo would be a major strategic and symbolic defeat for the insurgency, and some supporters of the uprising may
conclude that they have been defeated, though violence is unlikely to subside.
However, the Syrian government has also made major strides in another besieged enclave, closer to the capital. This
area, known as the Eastern Ghouta, is larger than Eastern Aleppo both in terms of area and population—it may have
around 450,000 inhabitants —but it has gained very little media interest. One reason is that the political situation of the
Eastern Ghouta is exceedingly complicated and diﬃcult to parse. Despite a three-year army siege, ruthless shelling and
airstrikes, and a sometimes very strict blockade on food and aid deliveries, discreet links have been maintained across
the front lines. Even as they wage war on each other, certain progovernment and pro-opposition commanders remain
connected through an informal wartime economy, muddling their political and military incentives and complicating any
analysis of the situation.
The Eastern Ghouta is unique even in terms of its political players. Northern Syria is dominated by Islamist factions like
Ahrar al-Sham, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Failaq al-Sham, and the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front (which renamed itself
Fateh al-Sham in July 2016 and claims to have cut its ties with al-Qaeda). But these groups have only a limited presence
in the Eastern Ghouta. There, instead, the insurgency has been led by factions indigenous to the area, including, at
various times, a major Salaﬁ group known as the Islam Army, the non-Salaﬁ Islamists of Ajnad al-Sham, the self-
declared Free Syrian Army faction Failaq al-Rahman, and local groups with opportunistic politics and uncertain
ideology, such as Fajr al-Umma and the coalition known as the Umma Army.
In mid-2013, one of these factions began to overshadow all rivals: the Islam Army, a military-religious organization led
by the Salaﬁ ﬁrebrand Zahran Alloush, who would come to play a pivotal part in the Eastern Ghouta rebellion. By early
2015, Alloush had managed to pressure nearly all other local factions into joining military and judicial institutions under
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Islam Army dominance. The power of the Islam Army kept smaller factions in check and brought a modicum of stability
to the enclave, allowing it to maintain a more or less united front against the Syrian government. Though he was
resisted and reviled by critics who opposed his autocratic methods, Alloush began to appear as one of the insurgency’s
few eﬀective state-builders.
The eﬀorts to establish a new political order under Alloush’s dominance make the Eastern Ghouta important to
understand—and tragically relevant for the rest of Syria and, indeed, for other fragmented insurgencies. For over ﬁve
years, the Syrian opposition has failed to produce any viable alternatives to the government it seeks to replace. Only two
credible state-building projects have emerged in the territories abandoned by Assad’s regime: the Sunni-fundamentalist
“caliphate” of the so-called Islamic State, and the Rojava region run by secular-leftist Kurdish groups. However, both
have developed in opposition to the general thrust of the Sunni Arab insurgency and neither could hope to seize
Damascus and rule Syria. While other Syrian opposition groups have created a variety of coalitions, military councils,
and rival leaderships-in-exile, they have failed to develop eﬀective ground-level governing structures that supersede
factional divides and are able to impose themselves on the population. In the Eastern Ghouta, an exception to that rule
seemed to be taking shape in 2014–15, led by the Islam Army.
But the balance of power that had enabled Alloush’s ascent eventually began to crumble, due to changes in the enclave’s
political economy that weakened the Islam Army and provoked conﬂicts over smuggling revenues. Alloush’s death in
December 2015 created a political vacuum that second- and third-tier factions sought to ﬁll. As the Islam Army’s
dominance faded, intra-rebel conﬂict resurfaced with devastating eﬀect.
In April 2016, major inﬁghting split the Eastern Ghouta enclave, putting a decisive end to the Eastern Ghouta’s
experiment with rebel unity. It also seems to have hastened the end of the enclave itself. In the months since, the Syrian
army has retaken about a third of the area, and it is now pushing to impose “ceaseﬁre” deals that will eﬀectively
dismantle the last anti-government stronghold near the Syrian capital. If this succeeds, Bashar al-Assad will have dealt a
crippling blow to the opposition.
Though the insurgency in the Eastern Ghouta has been the product of unique circumstances, the rise of its rebellion—
and now likely also its fall—remains instructive for what it tells us about the development of factionalized insurgencies,
how political order may be created from the bottom up, and what conditions facilitate state-building successes or
presage their failure.
Methodology
This report attempts to chronicle the evolution of the Eastern Ghouta’s politics since 2011, with a focus on the relations
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between local armed factions. Much could undoubtedly be written about how the Syrian government and its supporters
have reacted to events in the Eastern Ghouta, but such analysis falls outside the scope of this report except as it touches
directly on events inside the enclave.
Unable to carry out research in the Eastern Ghouta or even meaningfully in Damascus to investigate these issues, I have
instead relied on interviews with Syrians inside and outside the enclave, several of whom have to remain anonymous or
are referred to by a pseudonym. Some interviews have been conducted in person, but most have taken place through
Skype, phone, and email, or via Internet-based services such as WhatsApp, Telegram, Twitter, Viber, and Facebook.
I have drawn a great deal of material from press statements by the relevant rebel factions and from Syrian government
communications, as well as from online news sources and opposition forums in Arabic and English. Many rebel
commanders maintain an active presence on Twitter and Facebook, and local activists have produced a wealth of
commentary on social networking sites. Last but not least, coverage over the past few years by Syrian and international
media, including from other Arab countries, has been an invaluable resource.
Nonetheless, the dearth of systematic research and the lack of reliable source material has been a severe problem. In
many cases I have been forced to piece together key events and context by collecting and comparing scraps of limited,
biased, or contradictory data. Despite my best eﬀorts, this report is certain to contain errors of fact and interpretation,
and I would like to stress that those failures are mine alone; no interviewee or other source should be held responsible
for any of the descriptions, conclusions, or opinions expressed below.
The Eastern Ghouta
“…we came to Damascus; and we beheld it to be a city with trees and rivers and fruits and birds, as though
it were a paradise…”
–The Thousand and One Nights
Since ancient times, Damascus has been known for the beauty of the Ghouta.  A lush agricultural region into which old
irrigation channels and pumps drove water from the river Barada and the wells of Damascus, it encircled the city on the
west, south, and east, its expanse blocked only in the north by the bare, brown hump of Mount Qasioun. In the
fourteenth century, Arab historian and geographer Ibn al-Wardi deﬁned the Ghouta as “the region whose capital is
Damascus,” describing it as
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. . . full of water, ﬂowering trees, and passing birds, with exquisite ﬂowers, wrapped in branches and
paradise-like greenery. For eighteen miles, it is nothing but gardens and castles, surrounded by high
mountains in every direction, and from these mountains ﬂows water, which forms into several rivers
inside the Ghouta. It is the fairest place on earth, and the best of them.
In towns and villages like Douma, Saqba, Harasta, and Jobar, the people of the Ghouta lived oﬀ the land, only a short
distance from the bustle of the great city. Their olive and almond trees, orange groves, wheat ﬁelds, glittering canals, and
morning mists would be the ﬁrst sight of any traveler arriving to Damascus, a city known for its beauty—and that beauty
was the Ghouta.
Following Syria’s independence from France in 1946, urbanization and technological changes began to transform the
Damascene hinterland into a region of suburbs and satellite towns. Successive waves of refugees arrived, from Palestine
in 1948–49 and from the Golan Heights in 1967. They were joined by poor Syrians seeking employment or shelter.
Wheat ﬁelds were crisscrossed by roads and power lines, while factories, army compounds, and drab housing projects
spread out of the city and into the countryside. The ancient oasis seemed destined to disappear.
Douma, which had for hundreds of years been a small town of mosques and Islamic learning, grew into a city in its own
right. Many villages were swallowed up by the capital, with, for example, Jobar—once a picturesque multireligious
hamlet where Muslims and Jews tended their orchards—transformed into a series of mostly unremarkable city blocks on
the eastern fringes of Damascus. Above, the air hummed with ﬂights from the capital’s main airport, built in the
southeast of the Ghouta in the 1970s. The transformation and immigration picked up speed as time passed, and
statistics show a rapid expansion of new housing around Damascus from the 1990s onward.  This outward expansion of
the capital’s urban sprawl took place “without the slightest regard for environmental, aesthetic, or health concerns” and
often without building permissions or planning. It ended up creating what researchers have termed a “belt of misery”
around Damascus.
Through these changes, much of the Ghouta’s overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim population clung to local tradition. Many
were bitterly opposed to the authoritarian secularism of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, which had seized power in 1963,
and the Alawite military elite around the Assad family, which rose to power through then-defense minister Hafez al-
Assad’s November 1970 coup d’état. In the 1990s and the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, labor migration and
new information technologies allowed Gulf-backed Islamist movements to pick up on some of this discontent and
penetrate the Syrian countryside.
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Bashar al-Assad inherited power from his father in 2000. His ﬁrst decade as president was marked by painful economic
(as opposed to political) reforms, price shocks, and a severe drought, and more generally by the Ba’athist government’s
turn away from its traditional base in the countryside in favor of the big cities. In a climate of mounting social crisis,
discontent and desperation rose in rural regions, including the Ghouta. Throughout the ﬁrst decade of the new century,
slum areas around Damascus expanded rapidly as the capital and its satellite towns took in poor migrants, while
spiraling living costs forced parts of the Damascene middle class to abandon the inner city for a congested daily
commute. It was as if every driver of anti-regime resentment in the late Assad era had congregated on the outskirts of
Damascus: political frustration, religious revanchism, rural dispossession, and downward social mobility.
When the Arab uprisings swept into Syria in March 2011, the comparatively aﬄuent and carefully policed central
neighborhoods of the capital hardly stirred—but the Ghouta rose fast and hard in an angry, desperate rebellion. “When
the uprising ﬁrst reached the capital in 2011, I noticed something odd as I followed the news,” recalled the British writer
Matthew McNaught in a beautiful essay on the class dimension of the Syrian war as seen through the windows of the
capital’s ubiquitous microbus taxis, the servees:
The ﬁrst areas in Damascus that rose up against the regime sounded strangely familiar, although I had
never visited them: Jobar, Douma, Barzeh, Ghouta, Qaboun, Harasta. It took a moment before it hit me.
They were the names that I had seen every day on the roofs of passing microbuses. They were the
destinations of the routes; places on the outer limits of the city’s sprawling suburbs. Some of them were
lines that I had ridden regularly within the city. But I didn’t have any friends or students in these places.
There were no famous restaurants or beauty spots there. I’d never had a reason to ride the servees to the
end of the line.
Suddenly, the end of the line had determined to make itself a new beginning.
The Creation of an Enclave
Five years into the Syrian crisis, the war for the capital seems to be coming to an end. Resistance in the Western Ghouta
has been extinguished through the fall of Darayya in August 2016 and Khan al-Shih in November. Rebel areas south of
the capital have gone the same way, with the neighborhoods of Yarmouk and al-Hajar al-Aswad isolated and primed for
surrender.
Only east of Damascus does the rebellion still ﬂare violently, a lingering threat to Bashar al-Assad’s control over the
Syrian capital.
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In the Eastern Ghouta, government control began to fray almost immediately in March 2011, as the government cracked
down on any public expression of protest. Hundreds of demonstrators were killed or wounded by security forces in the
ﬁrst months of the crisis. Early attempts by commanders in the Republican Guard to negotiate with notables from
Douma, the largest city in the Eastern Ghouta, were overtaken by violence or, in some cases, blocked by hardliners in the
intelligence services.
Hardliners also surfaced on the opposition side. Masked men put up roadblocks and Kalashnikov-toting locals were seen
in Douma soon after the ﬁrst crackdowns, but there was no semblance of an organized armed rebellion. It took until
summer 2011 before a structured and politicized insurgency began to develop. Some of the armed groups were led by
local Islamists, including men recently amnestied by the government, but others were made up of military defectors or
local street toughs with no evident ideology. Many were inspired by Colonel Riad al-Asaad’s July 29 declaration in
Turkey of the establishment of the Free Syrian Army. While the Free Syrian Army was always more of a brand name than
an eﬀective organization, Asaad’s announcement accelerated the formation of armed groups across Syria by providing a
symbolic focal point and a template for armed resistance, and by shifting the wider opposition discourse in favor of a
military struggle.
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By the end of 2011, the opposition had seized entire neighborhoods in Douma and eastern Damascus and was disrupting
day-to-day government control over perhaps a million citizens. The army sent tanks into the east of the capital in
January 2012, brieﬂy wresting Saqba, Erbeen, Hammouriyeh, and other suburbs from the opposition in what had now
evolved into “urban war.”  But with large quantities of weapons being smuggled into the Ghouta area from Turkey, the
rebellion kept growing and the army could not sustain its gains. In late 2012, the last troops ﬂed Douma.
By early 2013, the opposition controlled an area in the Eastern Ghouta that stretched from the Damascus suburbs in the
west to the desert town of Oteiba in the east, and from Douma in the north to the outskirts of the Damascus
International Airport in the south. Within these lines, Bashar al-Assad’s government had ceased to exist.
At this point, Assad gave up his attempts to roll back the rebels and instead sought to contain them, backed by Shia
Islamist militias such as Lebanese Hezbollah and various Iraqi groups. The pro-Assad coalition launched a reinvigorated
oﬀensive to shore up government defenses, and then sent armored columns to cut oﬀ the ﬂow of arms from Turkey
through the Syrian desert.
In April 2013, the government retook Oteiba and began to choke oﬀ access to the rebel territory it had surrounded. The
opposition launched a counteroﬀensive in May, backed by nearly all the rebel groups that now operated in the area: the
Islam Brigade, the Douma Martyrs Brigade, the Martyrs of Islam, the Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and many others.
“The battle of Oteiba was a tipping point between success and disaster,” said a member of a rebel faction in the
Damascus region, who noted the town’s key role as a link between the Eastern Ghouta region and the smuggling routes
that ran through the desert and the Qalamoun Mountains. “It was not the only such place,” he said, “but it was the last
one.”
By mid-June, it was clear that the army could not be dislodged: the Eastern Ghouta had turned into an island of
opposition control, an isolated territory under siege. Having failed to break the siege in the east, the insurgent forces
were drawn deep into the battle for the Damascus suburbs. The ﬁghting was brutal and the rebels reported a growing
number of small, tactical nerve gas attacks, culminating in a gruesome massacre of civilians on August 21, 2013. As the
siege hardened, the horizons of the Eastern Ghouta shrank, and its defenders were increasingly preoccupied by how to
defend, organize, and rule the enclave in which they had been trapped.
A Key Leader: Zahran Alloush
As in all of Syria, the opposition in the Eastern Ghouta has suﬀered from its fragmentation. Over the past ﬁve years,
dozens of local factions have spawned and split in the areas east of Damascus, slowly coalescing to create a handful of
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larger umbrella movements.
The most important of the groups to emerge in the Eastern Ghouta was the Islam Army (Jaysh al-Islam), which rose to
dominance from 2013 onwards under the leadership of Mohammed Zahran Alloush, also known as Abu Abdullah. Over
the next two years, he would establish himself as the central ﬁgure in the enclave’s factional landscape and demonstrate
the pivotal role that a single individual can play in the midst of political upheaval. It is worth looking at his background
in some detail.
Zahran Alloush was born in Douma in 1971. His father, Abdullah Alloush (b. 1937), was an Islamic scholar who
espoused the ultra-orthodox Salaﬁ school of Sunni Islam, as understood by the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia.
This brand of Salaﬁsm stresses personal piety and doctrinal purity. But although it, too, seeks a theocracy based on the
strict application of sharia law and is hostile to Shia Muslims and other non-Sunni minorities, it diﬀers in important
respects from the Salaﬁ-jihadi teachings popular in al-Qaeda and likeminded movements. “It is a traditional type of
Salaﬁsm, what we call salaﬁyya ʻilmiyya [scholarly Salaﬁsm],” said Abdulrahman Alhaj, a Turkey-based specialist in
Syrian Islamism and a former minister in the opposition’s exile government. “They don’t have a global agenda. Their
agenda is almost purely religious and national. Jihad is not the aim, the aim is to correct people’s beliefs.”
Such views found fertile soil in Douma, a famously conservative city sometimes known as the City of Minarets. It is one
of very few places in Syria and the wider Levant to be dominated by the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam, which
predominates in Saudi Arabia, and this facilitated the spread of Salaﬁ teachings.
Abdullah Alloush had been one of the leading exponents of modern Salaﬁsm in the Eastern Ghouta. In the early 1980s,
he became the imam of the Tawhid Mosque in southern Douma, and in 1985 he was permitted to open a Douma branch
of the Assad Institute for Memorizing the Quran. At this time, the Syrian government focused its attention on the rival
Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been involved in an armed uprising in 1979–82, but the Alloush family
later came into conﬂict with both the authorities and rival clerics in Douma. Abdullah Alloush was never arrested, but
claims to have been repeatedly called in for questioning and suﬀered police harassment, and he eventually immigrated
to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s.  His son Zahran reportedly had his ﬁrst run-in with the security apparatus as a
teenager in 1987.
Zahran Alloush began to study Islam as a child, ﬁrst under his father and then under other Syrian religious scholars. He
continued his religious studies at Damascus University and later enrolled at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia,
studying under Salaﬁ religious luminaries such as Ibn Baz (1910–99), Ibn Othaimin (1925–2001), and Mohammed
Nasreddine al-Albani (1914–99). Back in Syria, Alloush capped his education with a master’s degree at the Sharia Faculty
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in Baramkeh in central Damascus. He then went into private business, with some sources saying he ran a shop or
company selling honey, while others insist that he founded a construction consultancy. Whatever the nature of his work,
his real vocation seems to have been secret Salaﬁ missionary activity. During that period, he was deeply involved in
running study circles and distributing banned religious literature, and possibly also in organizing support for the Iraqi
insurgency, though all sources seem to agree he never carried arms either in Iraq or in Syria.
In 2009, the Assad government arrested Zahran Alloush as part of a broader crackdown on Sunni religious activism and
Islamist militancy. He ended up in the Sednaya Prison alongside hundreds of other Islamist prisoners, many of whom
had volunteered with al-Qaeda in the Iraq War. Rubbing shoulders with these men, he reportedly emerged as a
respected leader in the prison. Alloush was still in jail when the Syrian uprising began in March 2011, but he was
released in a presidential amnesty on June 22, 2011. He immediately joined the budding insurgency in his hometown,
Douma.
2011–12: The Early Insurgency
In summer 2011, the Eastern Ghouta was a hotbed of political ferment. Several small groups had taken up arms against
the government, most of them using the Free Syrian Army moniker.
After his release from prison, Zahran Alloush and his Salaﬁ allies initially worked with the Obeida Ibn Jarrah Battalion
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of the Free Syrian Army, which was reportedly the ﬁrst armed group in the Eastern Ghouta.  Formally established
under that name in or around August 2011, it was led by “Abu Mohammed,” a retired Kurdish lieutenant-colonel from
the Rukneddine neighborhood of Damascus, and does not seem to have been an explicitly Islamist group.  However, as
the Damascus insurgency grew in autumn 2011 and new armed groups mushroomed across the region, the Obeida Ibn
Jarrah Battalion fell apart.
By September 2011 at the latest, Zahran Alloush had gathered his followers into a new faction under his own leadership.
Known as the Islam Company (Sariyat al-Islam), it reportedly started with a small core of only fourteen members,
several of them religious students or scholars like Alloush. It then grew quickly by drawing on old networks connected to
the Tawhid Mosque and other Salaﬁ institutions in Douma, an environment that apart from the Alloushes also included
members of the Boueidini, Delwan, and Sheikh Bzeineh families.  For example, the Salaﬁ preacher Saʻid Delwan (a.k.a.
Abu Nouman, 1948–) had led Friday prayers in the Tawhid Mosque in the 1980s, and he now lent his support to
Alloush’s militia.
Although others contributed to the founding of the Islam Company, Zahran Alloush was undisputedly its central ﬁgure.
He seems to have had a knack for organization, combined with an authoritarian, centralizing streak that would soon
make its mark on the Eastern Ghouta insurgency. The Islam Company appears to have borrowed its organizational
model from the Iraq War jihadi factions in which many Syrian Islamists had fought. It bestowed complete executive
power on Zahran Alloush, unchecked except by the constraints of sharia, and he would take advice but not orders from a
shura council (or “consultative council”) led by religious scholars and other important ﬁgures.
The Islam Company’s ﬁrst documented attack seems to have been a nighttime raid against a checkpoint in Mesraba,
near Douma, in September or October 2011.  But the group’s distinguishing feature was not, at this early stage, its
military capacity. Rather, the Islam Company stood out among the rebels in Douma for its overtly religious and
missionary character.
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Much of the early insurgency in the city was led by local toughs, who were sometimes members of Douma’s old families
and in some cases linked to organized crime. Though they wrapped themselves in Islamic rhetoric when appearing as
rebel leaders, many were not particularly religious or ideological. One Syrian researcher refers to them as qabadayat, an
old term for the opportunistic neighborhood strongmen who ruled the streets and played politics in Ottoman and French
mandate days.  Some such networks would later coalesce into Free Syrian Army groups like the Douma Martyrs’
Brigade or the Douma Shields Brigade, early incarnations of which played a major role in driving government forces out
of Douma city in 2012 under the leadership of local commanders Abu Subhi Taha (real name Ahmed Rateb) and Abu Ali
Khibbiyeh (real name Majed Khibbiyeh).
According to one of Zahran Alloush’s early associates, Essam Boueidani, the Islam Company approached these factions
as an ally and “taught them how to do the ablution and establish the prayer. Most of them didn’t pray. They were kind
people but they didn’t pray.”
The Islam Company’s religious identity was an important source of attraction as it sought to gather new recruits.
Though Alloush’s fundamentalist rhetoric and Saudi connections caused alarm among secularists and some anti-Salaﬁ
Islamic scholars, they were not strong or united enough to put up eﬀective resistance. More importantly, his views were
not unpopular with the much larger conservative Sunni population in Douma. Indeed, the Islam Company’s ability to
portray itself as a religiously observant and uncorrupted force against the Assad government drew recruits away from
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the Free Syrian Army factions. In turn, the Free Syrian Army factions ended up in the hands of opportunistic elements
who, according to the Syrian researcher Youssef Sadaki, “had no strategy and no vision; they were just ﬁghting to be
powerful and to get back in the spotlight.”
In early 2012, the Islam Company had emerged as one of the most powerful factions in Douma and in all of the Eastern
Ghouta. To emphasize its strength, Alloush renamed his group the Islam Brigade, or Liwa’ al-Islam. Its identity was
gradually becoming that of a big-tent Islamist movement seeking to represent the Ghouta region’s conservative Sunni
population and aspiring to a national role in Syria, though the top-level leadership remained ﬁrmly in the hands of
Alloush and his Douma Salaﬁs.
An important source of inﬂuence for Zahran Alloush was his family connections with Salaﬁ clerics in the Arab countries
of the Gulf, which he leveraged to improve the Islam Brigade’s ﬁnancial standing. Several Syrian expats and foreign
clerics dedicated themselves to collecting money on his behalf in Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Among the best
known was Adnan Arour, a Riyadh-based Syrian televangelist who had met Alloush during his days as a student in
Saudi Arabia. Originally from Hama, he had become immensely popular among Syrian rebels and Islamist-leaning
demonstrators for his feisty and unapologetically Sunni-sectarian denunciations of Assad. Many expat Syrians and other
Islamist supporters of the uprising donated money to Arour without knowing his precise aﬃliations inside Syria, and he
seems to have passed on considerable funds to Alloush.  The Islam Army’s deep pockets were an important reason for
its growing power, according to Sadaki. “When money started rolling in to Zahran Alloush and he was able to pay his
soldiers $150 or $200 a month, which is a lot inside the Ghouta, people left [the other Douma factions],” he said.
Another source of inﬂuence for Alloush was the arms trade. Several local alliances had been set up in the Damascus
region under the Free Syrian Army brand, such as Colonel Khaled al-Habbous’s Military Council of Damascus and Its
Countryside, created in March 2012, and Captain Abdel-Nasr Shmeir’s Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern
Ghouta, created in September 2012. These councils were organizationally unstable and failed to inspire much loyalty
among the ﬁghters, but some of them played a role in channeling arms from foreign sponsors.
According to Habbous, his Military Council began to serve as a channel for arms shipments from Turkey in mid-2012.
Large amounts of weapons and ammunition had by then been collected in now-stateless Libya by Syrian exiles and the
Muslim Brotherhood, with assistance from Libyan Islamists, Qatar, and the Turkish government. The ﬁrst leg of the
arms transports seems to have been handled by the Farouq Battalions, a group that had emerged in the Homs region in
2011 and now controlled areas on the Syrian-Turkish border. To reach the areas east of Damascus, the smugglers then
had to bring their cargo from Homs through the mountainous Qalamoun region.
Alloush refused to join the Military Council, allegedly because he saw the defected oﬃcers as impious ex-Ba’athists, but
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he collaborated with the group in order to tap into its arms smuggling network. According to Habbous—who, it should
be noted, has made a number of unsubstantiated accusations against the Islam Army—Alloush was made responsible for
distributing weapons in the Ghouta, but ended up diverting most of the cargo to his own allies. “In this way, the Islam
Company started to develop,” Habbous said, “because Sheikh Zahran was the one—or rather one of the members of the
committee—that distributed the arms.”
On July 18, 2012, the Islam Brigade gained national (and international) attention by claiming responsibility for the
assassination of several senior security oﬃcials at the National Security Oﬃce in Damascus, including Bashar al-Assad’s
brother-in-law General Assef Shawkat and Defense Minister Dawoud Rajha.  The incident remains murky and it is
possible that this was either an opportunistic false claim on Alloush’s part, or an operation executed by someone else—
such as a foreign intelligence service—who credited the Islam Brigade in order to escape attention. Whatever the case,
the Islam Brigade was able to use its newfound notoriety to attract additional funds and recruits.
In its claim of responsibility for the July 18 attack, the Islam Brigade had still referred to itself as part of the Free Syrian
Army, but in the following months it dropped this label. Free Syrian Army symbols had been in general use among the
Syrian rebels, but by mid-2012 they were falling out of fashion as the main factions of the insurgency began to emphasize
a religious and sectarian Sunni discourse. The Free Syrian Army brand remained in usage as a general term for the
insurgency and would later reemerge as a collective name for Western-approved factions, but Alloush’s group chose to
instead double down on its Islamist identity.
2013: Rise of the Islam Army
As the conﬂict entered its third year, Zahran Alloush was becoming a ﬁgure of national importance. Drawing on old
contacts from Sednaya Prison, he developed a broad network in northern Syria and Turkey, where some of his former
fellow inmates were present in the leadership of groups like Ahrar al-Sham and the Nusra Front. But his primary focus
seems to have been closer to home.
The Assad government and its security apparatus had been expelled from Alloush’s hometown of Douma in late 2012,
creating a power vacuum that had yet to be ﬁlled. Alloush’s main rival in this area was the Douma Martyrs’ Brigade, a
group with roots in the early, nonreligious rebel networks that had led the capture of Douma. Although their conﬂict was
not primarily about ideology, Alloush’s growing power had prompted a closing of ranks among secular activists and rival
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religious groups, such as Suﬁ clerics who feared the rise of Salaﬁsm. The Douma Martyrs’ Brigade became the primary
beneﬁciary of this backlash, and the two factions began to compete for power in Douma by trying to attract smaller
armed groups to their respective sides.
These power struggles seem to have played out almost exclusively within the opposition itself, with little involvement
from the wider population. All factions clearly had some grassroots inﬂuence and there was considerable support for the
rebellion as such, but none of the commanders seemed to have developed a genuine civilian following or an organized
popular base. It was not even clear that they were trying. With rare exceptions, the rebels did not form political parties,
nor did they stage elections or seek to mobilize the wider population for their purposes through organizations or public
rallies, except for the ongoing Friday demonstrations against Assad. There were attempts at political and associative
action, but these mostly seemed to be initiatives from civilian activists who had no clout among the armed factions. And
though the Islamists worked to inﬂuence public opinion through the mosques and missionary outreach, the overall
impression was that of an insurgency whose commanders simply took popular support for granted.
The lack of a central authority in Douma after the expulsion of the regime had led to growing lawlessness. Several of the
armed groups now ran their own sharia courts and private prisons. Some rebel commanders were becoming infamous
for thuggish behavior and criminality and there were sporadic bouts of inﬁghting. As the economic situation and local
security deteriorated, the rebels seemed to realize that their internal divisions and failure to govern had become a
liability.
In March 2013, rebel commanders in Douma gathered to create the Douma Mujahideen Council in order to rule the city
and tamp down intra-factional conﬂict.  Though the council included many small factions, it was dominated by and
polarized between the Islam Brigade and the Douma Martyrs’ Brigade. The two factions had decided to divide power
between themselves, with the Douma Martyrs’ Brigade commander Abu Subhi Taha becoming president of the alliance
and Zahran Alloush taking up leadership of its religious advisory board, the Shura Council.
However, the balance of power soon tilted in Alloush’s favor, as smaller factions began to join the Islam Brigade. There
seem to have been several reasons for this, including the organizational talents of Alloush’s team and his support from
Douma’s Salaﬁ civil society networks. But another reason was the rising foreign support for the Islam Brigade.
In mid-2013, or perhaps earlier, a Kuwaiti charity called the Council of Supporters of the Syrian Revolution had emerged
as one of Alloush’s most important foreign sponsors.  It had been set up the previous year under the leadership of the
Kuwaiti parliamentarian Mohammed Hayef al-Moteiri, and it collected a great deal of money. For example, a twenty-
four-day fundraising drive in February 2013 listed a goal of 500,000 Kuwaiti dinars, or $1.75 million.  Much of these
funds went into humanitarian projects, but the Council of Supporters did not try to hide the fact that they also ﬁnanced
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armed factions. For example, the group’s June 2013 fundraiser was called “The Mobilization Campaign to Support the
Mujahideen in Syria,”  and among its projects was the building of an arms factory in the Eastern Ghouta.
Over summer and autumn 2013, the Council of Supporters pumped cash into Alloush’s coﬀers with the unspoken aim of
trying to engineer a Ghouta-wide supergroup under his leadership, reportedly directing 70 percent of their donations
speciﬁcally to the Islam Brigade. On September 29, Alloush declared the merger of the Islam Brigade and forty-two
other armed groups into what would be called the Islam Army (Jaysh al-Islam).  Other small factions quickly decided to
bandwagon with Alloush, and by November, the Islam Army claimed to comprise no fewer than sixty rebel factions.
Though this was probably an exaggeration, there was no doubt that the Islam Army had grown into a very powerful
group.
The summer and autumn of 2013 allegedly also marked the start of serious Saudi support for Alloush, possibly through
or in coordination with the Kuwaiti network. “Saudi tribal ﬁgures have been making calls on behalf of Saudi
intelligence,” a Damascene rebel commander told Reuters after the Islam Army merger. “Their strategy is to oﬀer
ﬁnancial backing in return for loyalty and staying away from al-Qaeda. ” The suspicions of a Saudi connection were
further strengthened when it emerged that Alloush had quietly slipped out of the Eastern Ghouta to visit Saudi Arabia
for the hajj pilgrimage right after the announcement of the Islam Army.
However, Alloush’s links to Riyadh often seemed to be exaggerated by his rivals on the jihadi end of the Salaﬁ spectrum,
who were sensitive to and fearful of any Saudi intelligence involvement. In fact, he seemed to be taking money from
many sources. There had previously been hints of a Qatari connection, and it seems quite possible that the Islam Army
still relied on diverse and mostly nongovernmental sources of funding.
Whoever was responsible for his rise, there could no longer be any doubt that Zahran Alloush was now the most
powerful man in the Eastern Ghouta and that he was steadily getting stronger. He leveraged his military might by
oﬀering protection to wealthy businessmen and minor commanders, while using his money to set up charities to curry
favor with the population, fund friendly preachers and mosques, and lure new recruits with weapons and a steady salary.
With Alloush now too big to share power equitably with anyone, the power-sharing arrangements agreed in his
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hometown through the Douma Mujahideen Council broke down. In October 2013, the council president and Douma
Martyrs’ Brigade commander Abu Subhi Taha expelled Alloush from the leadership of the coalition. The putsch was
cheered on by secular activists and perhaps also by rival foreign powers, but Alloush had no intention of allowing
himself to be legislated out of power. He simply pulled his followers out of the council, which duly collapsed. Abu Subhi
Taha was temporarily cowed, but continued to plot his revenge.
The following month, virtually all of Alloush’s regional rivals gathered into yet another short-lived alliance, this one
called the Greater Damascus Operations Room, which had been conceived of as a coordination structure for both the
Western and the Eastern Ghouta.  Though it was an impressive project on paper, it didn’t work well and it ultimately
failed to balance the rise of Alloush. The Eastern Ghouta had now been sealed oﬀ from surrounding territories by the
army siege and, inside its enclave, the Islam Army was too powerful to be isolated. Left as the biggest ﬁsh in a shrinking
pond, Alloush was instead ﬁnally able to impose himself on the smaller factions, ﬁrst in Douma and then in the wider
Eastern Ghouta.
Repression and Controversies
The Islam Army’s growing power brought increased scrutiny of its humanitarian track record, which was not comforting.
The chaos that had plagued the enclave was giving way to an order of sorts, but it was built on a balance between armed
factions and on repressive policing. Alloush had created a security branch that was beginning to spread its inﬂuence far
outside Douma, often setting up oﬃces to encroach on the turf of smaller factions. There were occasional military
skirmishes, while civilian opponents of the Islam Army could face harassment, threats, and beatings. The group ran
several private prison facilities, such as the Repentance Prison (Sijn al-Toubah), which gained a terrifying reputation for
torture and abuses.
“Of course the siege and the indiscriminate attacks of the government are the most important part of the destruction of
these areas, but it was also due to the behavior of these armed groups,” recalled Bassam al-Ahmed, a former
spokesperson for the Violations Documentation Center, a human rights group based in the Eastern Ghouta. “It is no
longer a secret that this experience has failed to bring anything better than Assad in that respect. By 2016, a lot of
activists have been forced to leave. Many of them have been abducted, kidnapped, and tortured.”
The repression also touched Ahmed’s own group. In December 2013, the Violations Documentations Center’s founder
and president, the well-known human rights lawyer Razan Zeitouneh, was kidnapped in Douma along with her husband
Wa’el Hammada and two other secular democracy activists, Samira Khelil and Nazem Hammadi.  Never heard from
since, it is widely believed that they were murdered after capture. Though the Islam Army has denied involvement,
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human rights groups and relatives of the “Douma Four” hold Alloush responsible, pointing to a history of threats and
harassment against the activists by his security oﬃcers.  A young and charismatic intellectual who had publicly
advocated for democracy even before 2011, Razan Zeitouneh was an iconic ﬁgure for much of the secular opposition, and
she was closely connected to Western human rights monitors. Her disappearance came to deﬁne Zahran Alloush in the
eyes of many liberal Syrians and foreign observers, and it would later obstruct his attempts to clean up the Islam Army’s
image and build relations with the West.
The Islam Army’s politics were also coming in for criticism. In line with his religious beliefs, Alloush was an out-and-out
opponent of democracy and he indulged in menacing Sunni-sectarian rhetoric that sometimes bordered on the
genocidal. For example, in a September 2013 propaganda video, he had vowed to cleanse the Levant from the “ﬁlth” of
Shia Islam.  Among secular Syrian intellectuals and pro-opposition Western observers, he was now being held up as an
example of the “bad rebel.”
In fact, such sectarian notions had become mainstream within the armed insurgency two years into the war. Alloush’s
opinions were at odds with the idealized democratic revolution envisioned by the Western media, Western oﬃcialdom,
and the democratic opposition itself, but among the ﬁghters on the ground, Islamist values predominated and there was
no evidence that Alloush’s anti-Shia statements had hurt his standing. If anything, they seemed to be broadly shared and
appreciated, which was presumably why they were part of the Islam Army’s public propaganda in the ﬁrst place.
Indeed, rather than shunning him, the other major factions in Syria sought his support. On November 22, 2013, the
Islam Army created an alliance known as the Islamic Front alongside some of the most powerful factions in the country,
including the Tawhid Brigade of Aleppo, Idlib’s Suqour al-Sham, and the large Salaﬁ group Ahrar al-Sham,  all of
whom espoused Islamist views similar to those of Alloush. The Islamic Front alliance mattered greatly in northern Syria,
where the Islam Army had by now acquired subfactions operating along the Turkish border, but it had little direct
impact on the politics of the Eastern Ghouta. It did however raise Alloush’s proﬁle as a top-ranking opposition leader on
the national level, a status that no other rebel commander in the Damascus region could aspire to.
2014: Uniting the Eastern Ghouta
In early 2014, most of the groups in the Eastern Ghouta seemed to accept that Zahran Alloush had become ﬁrst among
equals inside the enclave, despite vocal opposition from unrelenting rivals like his old competitors in Douma, Abu Subhi
Taha, and Abu Ali Khibbiyeh.
After two years of failed coalition building, it was this grudging admission of Alloush’s leading role that ﬁnally made
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broad coalitions possible, by creating a clear center of gravity. It paved the way for a solution of the now dangerously
pressing problem of how to govern the enclave, which had remained in a state of semi-anarchy since the expulsion of
Assad’s government two years prior, with each rebel faction running its own aﬀairs the way it saw ﬁt and a chaotic tangle
of sharia courts and revolutionary councils vying for inﬂuence over legal and administrative matters.
On June 24, 2014, the Islam Army and sixteen other rebel factions announced the creation of the Eastern Ghouta’s
Uniﬁed Judicial Council, the ﬁrst enclave-wide union of rebel-backed Islamic courts. Led by a panel of religious scholars,
its role would be to impartially administer sharia law across the enclave through a centrally coordinated system of
regional courts and institutions. Unlike some of the other post-Assad judicial systems created in the Eastern Ghouta, the
Uniﬁed Judicial Council had no trained lawyers or judges on its governing board, only Islamic scholars. In practice,
most of the sheikhs represented speciﬁc armed factions, in order to secure support from these factions for the council.
And it worked: at its creation, the Uniﬁed Judicial Council was backed by every major faction in the Eastern Ghouta,
though the al-Qaeda-aligned Nusra Front soon broke oﬀ to run its own sharia courts instead.
On August 27, 2014, this was followed by the creation of a Uniﬁed Military Command, which became the highest
military and civilian authority in the Eastern Ghouta. It was founded by ﬁve of the enclave’s most powerful factions: the
Islam Army, Ajnad al-Sham, Failaq al-Rahman, the al-Habib al-Mustafa Brigades, and the Eastern Ghouta branch of
Ahrar al-Sham. Alloush headed the command, with the Ajnad al-Sham leader Yasser al-Qadri as his deputy and Failaq
al-Rahman’s Abdel-Nasr Shmeir as his ﬁeld commander.
Qadri, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Fateh, was born in 1983 in Damascus to a family from Reyhani near Douma. A
young religious scholar with a degree from Cairo’s al-Azhar University, he had also studied under several famous
Damascene sheikhs and his family had strong links to the Muslim Brotherhood.  Ajnad al-Sham matched the
background of its leader: it had been formed in November 2013 as a project of the traditionalist Damascene clergy,
possibly also with support from the Muslim Brotherhood.  Backed by a broad array of Suﬁ and traditionalist Islamic
scholars, many of whom were hostile to Salaﬁsm, it had enough ideological and ﬁnancial muscle to retain its
independence vis-à-vis the Islam Army, but it now grudgingly accepted to work under Alloush’s command.
Captain Abdel-Nasr Shmeir, also known as Abu al-Nasr, was born in 1977 in the city of al-Rastan near Homs, but had
married into the family of a religious sheikh in the Eastern Ghouta. Unlike his fellow rebel leaders, Shmeir was neither a
student nor a scholar of Islam, instead serving as an army captain until defecting in April 2012. In August 2012, he
headed an armed group known as the al-Bara Battalion, which made headlines by kidnapping forty-eight Iranians on
pilgrimage to the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine; Shmeir claimed that they were Iranian intelligence oﬃcers. The Iranians were
released in October that year in a murky deal that involved a prisoner exchange and reportedly also a large ransom
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payment.  These funds seem to have helped Shmeir remain independent of Alloush and develop the al-Bara Battalion
into the much-larger Failaq al-Rahman network, which was created in late 2013. Shmeir drew on his military
background to emphasize nationalist themes and a Free Syrian Army identity, seemingly trying to position Failaq al-
Rahman as the Eastern Ghouta’s non-Islamist alternative.
The Uniﬁed Military Command had gathered the most powerful factions in the Eastern Ghouta, with one very
signiﬁcant exception: the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. A host of lesser commanders also refused to abide by
its rules, notably the disgruntled Douma rebels Abu Subhi Taha and Abu Ali Khibbiyeh, both of whom had a bone to
pick with Alloush. One source later estimated that “close to half ” of the enclave’s rebels had stayed outside of the Uniﬁed
Military Command at the time of its formation.  Alloush and his partners clearly had their work cut out for them if they
wanted to use the new alliance to control the enclave.
Perhaps a bigger problem was that the members themselves often refused to abide by the rules of the Uniﬁed Military
Command. The armed groups jealously guarded their military and ﬁnancial independence, and despite their public vows
to let the Uniﬁed Judicial Council handle all legal matters, they continued to run private prisons and security forces.
They also continued to wrestle over local resources and occasionally skirmished with each other. Even so, the new
institutions did provide a useful basis for joint action and the institutionalization of political life in the Eastern Ghouta—
and Alloush was already making plans for how to deal with the dissenters who refused to join.
Destroying the Anti-Alloush Opposition
In September 2014, soon after the creation of the Uniﬁed Military Command, around twenty small groups that had
refused to endorse the new system coalesced into two new coalitions, known as the Umma Army and Failaq Omar.
The most pugnacious of these alliances was the Umma Army. Led by the veteran Douma rebel Abu Subhi Taha and his
associate Abu Ali Khibbiyeh, the Umma Army was a hodgepodge of Free Syrian Army groups and local gangs held
together mostly by their shared hatred of Zahran Alloush. Some of its members were linked to the Southern Front of the
Free Syrian Army, a rebel coalition on the border with Jordan that received support from the Jordan-based and United
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States-backed Military Operations Center, or MOC.
Both Taha and Khibbiyeh had played a pioneering role in the early uprising in Douma and they were well-known ﬁgures
in their home community, but they were also associated with smuggling and criminality. Unable to build major popular
support or construct an eﬀective movement, they had struggled in sullen opposition to the Islam Army since 2012.
Among other things, they had oﬀered protection to some of Douma’s secular opposition leaders, though it is less clear
whether this was a question of genuine political beliefs or if they simply wanted to spite Alloush. In this way, they had
emerged as central ﬁgures in the anti-Islam Army opposition in Douma.
After his marginalization at the hands oﬀ Alloush in 2012, “Abu Ali Khibbiyeh didn’t have that many people with him
anymore, but by the end of 2013 and in 2014, people were drawing closer to Islamic and Salaﬁ thoughts, and some
opposed this,” explained Youssef Sadaki, of the Orient Research Center. “For them, it was not about whether Abu Ali
Khibbiyeh was a bad person or not, or about whether he smuggled and stole. It was about Zahran Alloush becoming all-
powerful and trying to ﬁnish oﬀ everyone else. So people gathered around Abu Ali Khibbiyeh.”
When Zahran Alloush learned of the Umma Army’s challenge to his unity project, he reacted with outrage, threatening
its leaders and stating that the Eastern Ghouta could not suﬀer having “two heads on the same body.”  Clashes between
the groups erupted almost immediately. In late October 2014, the Umma Army agreed to recognize Alloush’s leadership
of the Uniﬁed Military Command, but the conﬂict continued.
One front of the struggle appears to have played out at the Waﬁdeen Crossing near Douma, where Abu Ali Khibbiyeh
and his allies were running a lucrative siege-busting business with the complicity of traders and military commanders on
the government side. When the Islam Army moved in and began arresting Umma Army members, apparently also
seizing some of the goods that had come through the crossing, the Syrian government shut down all trade. This sparked
an instant humanitarian crisis in the Eastern Ghouta. The Umma Army blamed Alloush, slamming him as a dictator
and a war proﬁteer who had stolen food from the starving. He in turn castigated the Umma Army leaders as drug
dealers, smugglers, and agents of both the Islamic State and the Syrian government.  To further weaken Alloush,
Umma Army members in Harasta decided to stop the Islam Army from using their smuggling tunnels to bring in
otherwise unavailable supplies.
As the crisis grew, the Umma Army encouraged demonstrations against Alloush, accusing him of hoarding food and of
being Assad’s silent partner in the siege. In mid-November 2014, armed demonstrators stormed Islam Army warehouses
in Douma, egged on by the Umma Army. “The guards ﬁred on us directly, which prompted some protesters to ﬁre back,
leading to serious injuries among some residents,” a local activist told the online journal Al-Monitor.
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However, if the Umma Army leaders had thought that they could force Zahran Alloush to share power, they had badly
misjudged the man. In late December 2014, the Islam Army declared that it would now “cleanse the land of corrupt ﬁlth”
and launched a ferocious, no-holds-barred military assault on the Umma Army.  Zahran Alloush’s partners in the
Uniﬁed Military Command publicly criticized him for acting outside the framework of the joint institutions, but none of
them intervened to defend the Umma Army on the battleﬁeld.
Left alone to face Alloush, the Umma Army did not stand a chance. The Islam Army leader later claimed to have jailed
thirteen hundred members of the group.  Abu Subhi Taha’s fate remains unclear, but the Islam Army later released a
video in which a subdued-looking Abu Ali Khibbiyeh, who had been captured after a manhunt in early January 2015,
confessed to being a criminal, a narcotics trader, and a homosexual.  According to some reports, he was executed nine
months later.
Alloush dealt with Failaq Omar, the other faction created in September 2014 that opposed him, in a more cautious
fashion. The group had its roots in the Marj area on the southern end of the enclave and seems to have been a local
enterprise linked to Bedouin clans and hardline Islamists. Starting in July 2014, the Islam Army’s secret police had
waged an unsparing war against the Islamic State, which escalated in 2015 as Alloush declared that even ideological
sympathy for the jihadists would be considered a crime.  Some Islamic State cells were apparently operating inside
Failaq Omar, which exposed the group to repeated crackdowns. Weakened and wary of suﬀering the same fate as the
Umma Army, the remaining leaders of Failaq Omar ﬁnally gave up and joined the Islam Army in April 2015.
Meanwhile, another potential rival to Zahran Alloush collapsed in a complicated split. In March 2015, Ahrar al-Sham’s
local branch in the Eastern Ghouta was bought up by Failaq al-Rahman, though some members immediately backed out
and sought to revive the Ahrar al-Sham brand.  A dispute over ammunition stockpiles and bases followed, in which the
Islam Army sided with Failaq al-Rahman—possibly in return for some of the spoils. The Uniﬁed Military Command then
sought to enforce a February 2015 ban on the creation of new factions, which eﬀectively outlawed Ahrar al-Sham in the
Eastern Ghouta.  Fearing complete isolation and eager to aid anyone that opposed the Uniﬁed Military Command, the
Nusra Front stepped in to protect the dissidents. However, according to the Syrian researcher and opposition member
Ahmed Aba-Zeid, this rump faction of Ahrar al-Sham comprised only about one hundred ﬁghters, meaning that Ahrar
al-Sham was more or less ﬁnished as an independent force in the Eastern Ghouta.
Since the smaller groups were now formally banned from creating new alliances or seceding from old ones, the
insurgency began to solidify at a higher pace. Most of the remaining mini-groups were pulled into the orbit of one of the
“big three” members of the Uniﬁed Military Command: the Islam Army, Ajnad al-Sham, or Failaq al-Rahman.
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As the factional muck slowly drained away, only the Nusra Front remained as an explicit challenger to the new system. It
continued to run its own sharia courts outside the Uniﬁed Judicial Council system, to which citizens could turn if they
didn’t like the courts provided by Alloush and his allies. Alloush repeatedly stated that this state of aﬀairs could not
continue and that he would not permit anyone to run a legal system outside the United Judicial Council.  The Uniﬁed
Military Command was also mobilized to demand that the Nusra Front shut down its courts and submit to the Uniﬁed
Judicial Council.  But the jihadis refused, and Alloush did not, in the end, move against them militarily.
This exception aside, the new institutions were gaining considerable traction. By early 2015, every major faction in the
Eastern Ghouta except the jihadis had endorsed them. Though senior members of the rebel factions were practically
untouchable, civilians were now largely being referred to the sharia courts of the Uniﬁed Judicial Council. The
homogenization of the enclave also proceeded apace on the social level, through the enforcement of strict religious
norms. In summer 2015, a new religious police appeared on the streets of Douma to promote Islamic morals and sharia
law. Though critics complained that it was a way for the Islam Army to unilaterally impose its worldview on others, the
group’s leaders could now claim to act on behalf of the Uniﬁed Judicial Council.
Yet, while Alloush used the new institutions to legitimize and magnify his own power, he refused to be constrained by
them. He had not consulted his allies ahead of the crackdowns on the Umma Army and the Islamic State, and when the
Uniﬁed Judicial Council asked for access to his own prisons or tried to investigate the fate of Abu Subhi Taha, the Islam
Army shrugged it oﬀ.
As for the Islam Army, it had now developed into a large and well-equipped military force commanding thousands of
ﬁghters. Already oﬃcially named the Eastern Ghouta’s supreme commander, Zahran Alloush seemed to be seeking the
role as its undisputed ruler. In April 2015, the Islam Army released video footage of a large military parade, with long
rows of uniformed soldiers and tanks marching past a parade stand where Alloush sat on a chair ﬂanked by his
lieutenants.  More than anything, it seemed designed to emulate a traditional Arab army, with Alloush in the role of a
traditional Arab president.
The Economy of a Siege
The siege imposed on the Eastern Ghouta in 2013 played a major role in the evolution of its politics. Government-
imposed restrictions on trade and aid deliveries created a very particular war economy, which left rebel factions
dependent on the government but also increased those factions’ inﬂuence over the population. In the climate of scarcity
created by the siege, the small number of semioﬃcial frontline crossings and tunnels that could be used to import goods
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provided the government with new leverage and engendered new forms of competition among the rebels. Actors on the
government side proﬁted from the siege and acquired a vested interest in maintaining it, and rebel commanders also
increasingly adapted to the siege economy.
Understanding the background and functioning of this peculiar siege economy is crucial to understanding the Eastern
Ghouta’s rebel politics, and it provides an instructive example of how ﬁnancial constraints and opportunities can shape
the political and military situation in counterintuitive ways.
As has been described above, the government initially laid siege to the Eastern Ghouta after its capture of Oteiba in April
2013. In the following months, the government moved to seal the main entry routes to the enclave at Mleiha in the south
and near the Waﬁdeen Camp in the north. Some trade quietly continued, but the siege was further tightened and
expanded into a comprehensive economic blockade in early 2014, when the army recaptured Mleiha and took steps to
fully close the Waﬁdeen Crossing. Later in 2014, a limited trade resumed via progovernment businessmen and their
rebel intermediaries. But while this allowed food and fuel prices in the enclave to stabilize at a high level, supply has
remained spotty and prices sometimes spike due to ﬁghting, checkpoint closures, the destruction of smuggling tunnels,
or market manipulations. Civilians have remained trapped inside the enclave, unable to cross the frontlines and
prevented from leaving by both government forces and local rebel groups, notably the Islam Army.
The blockade has caused severe human suﬀering inside the enclave. For an example of the price inﬂation, the pro-
opposition Douma Coordination Group published the following comparison between the Eastern Ghouta and what it
termed “Occupied Damascus” in March 2015. (Units diﬀer from product to product, while prices are listed in Syrian
pounds.)
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Table 1. Price of Goods Comparison, Eastern Ghouta vs. Damascus, March 2015
Product Eastern Ghouta Damascus
Sugar 2750 120
Eggs 5100 750
Bread 750 35
Tea 8000 1200
Heating Oil 1100 120
Potatoes 1300 90
Lentils 1600 125
Source: Posted on the author’s Twitter account on March 4, 2015.
The rebels did what they could to counter the eﬀects of the new policy, including trying to grow more food inside the
besieged area and using aid money to subsidize certain goods. Nevertheless, the blockade crippled normal life in the
Eastern Ghouta and it had a severe impact on the civilian population, which suﬀered from malnutrition and the
depletion of medical supplies. The opposition-friendly Syrian American Medical Society estimates that more than two
hundred civilians in the enclave died from a lack of food or access to medical care between October 2012 and January
2015,  and Amnesty International concluded that the Syrian government’s blockade on food and medicine in the
Eastern Ghouta amounted to a crime against humanity.
Apart from its eﬀect on the civilian population, the blockade has had a profound impact on the structure and cohesion of
the Eastern Ghouta insurgency. On the one hand, new types of conﬂict emerged, as rebel commanders jockeyed for
control over scarce resources, smuggling routes, and government-approved imports. On the other hand, those who
successfully monopolized some facet of the siege economy proﬁted greatly and could expand their inﬂuence in the
enclave. Government-connected businessmen have similarly used the siege to gain inﬂuence in Damascus and over the
rebels. Army and intelligence chiefs have enriched themselves at checkpoints controlling access to the enclave, and the
government also seems to have exploited its ability to turn trade on and oﬀ in order to sow enmity among the rebels.
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“Keep in mind that the regime wants to strengthen a certain faction at the expense of other factions,” said a member of a
rebel group operating in the Damascus region. “So it will open a crossing and call it civilian or a humanitarian, and then
it turns a blind eye to what passes through there.”
The Million-Pound Checkpoint
Though neither side has been eager to talk about it, a deal emerged in 2014 through which select progovernment traders
are allowed to bring goods to the frontline near the army-controlled Waﬁdeen Camp.
Though the arrangement has occasionally broken down or been temporarily suspended by the government, the so-called
Waﬁdeen Crossing has remained the most important outside source of food for the enclave since then and it is often
described as the “lung” through which the Eastern Ghouta breathes. In June 2015, a local trader working the Waﬁdeen
Crossing explained to Amnesty International how it operates:
To leave Douma I need to pass by a non-state armed group checkpoint then I drive for a couple of minutes
passing by an area that is not controlled by anyone. Then I pass by three checkpoints controlled by the Air
Force Intelligence and State Security forces. I reach al-Wafedine camp where I buy the food. I do not leave
the truck. Two women with me in the car transfer the food and non-food items to the truck and pay the
security forces. For every item I pay a price equivalent to eight or ten times the price in central
Damascus.
Commanders on both sides of the front will demand a cut from the trade, turning the enclave’s captive market into “a
source of monetary support for the regime,” but also, paradoxically, for the rebels.  Consumers inside the Eastern
Ghouta end up paying enormously inﬂated prices even on larger shipments, as described in a 2015 report from the
London School of Economics:
Assume a businessman in Ghouta wants to buy a ton of sugar which costs USD 0.5 per kilo in Damascus;
he would then coordinate with a businessman in Damascus who is connected with certain security
oﬃcials in the government and would then source the sugar and deliver it across the government-
controlled checkpoint ʻOne Million Crossing’ entering the ʻexchange zone’. To make it there, certain fees
have to be paid. The businessman from Ghouta, who in turn has to be connected with the right
commanders in the opposition, enters this zone after crossing the opposition-controlled checkpoint,
completes the deal, receives the sugar then enters Ghouta again after paying fees at the opposition
controlled checkpoint. When the time is right, this businessman would then sell the sugar for the highest
price to smaller dealers and stall sellers and ﬁnally to arrive to the end user with the price of USD 11.8 per
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kilo, a twenty-four fold increase in price. To put it diﬀerently, for each ton of sugar which costs USD 500 a
staggering USD 11,265 is going to feed this well-established network of war proﬁteers and violent actors.
On the government side, the crossing has become so proﬁtable that it is known in Damascus as Hajez al-Milyoun “the
Million Checkpoint,” in reference to the earnings of the soldiers manning it.  The checkpoints do not seem to be
manned by the regular army. Rather, various sources name diﬀerent security and military branches as being in control of
the trade, with most pointing to either the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, or the Republican Guard, or both.
On the rebel side, the Douma–Waﬁdeen route was at one point controlled in whole or in part by the Free Syrian Army
faction of Abu Ali Khibbiyeh. In the autumn and winter of 2014, Zahran Alloush sent troops to seize Khibbiyeh’s
checkpoints, as part of his crackdown on the Umma Army. Since then, the Waﬁdeen Crossing has been in Islam Army
hands. The group reportedly exercises strict control over food imports. Traders are forced to acquire signed permits if
they wish to bring food into the Eastern Ghouta, and they must sell and oﬄoad all foodstuﬀs at Islam Army-protected
warehouses. In this way, the Islam Army and its surrogate businessmen have gained near-monopolistic control over food
imports. However, traders are allowed to bring nonfood items, like cigarettes, into the Eastern Ghouta and sell these
privately at a higher proﬁt.
Eastern Ghouta activists have accused the Islam Army of taking a 30 percent cut from each shipment and of making
“unimaginable” proﬁts,  but the Islam Army denies having any economic interest in the trade. The Waﬁdeen Crossing
“is open only to some civilians who transport small amounts of certain goods by foot, or to humanitarian convoys, as well
as to a trader who runs a barter operation through the crossing. He brings out certain products from the Ghouta and
brings in some of the things it needs,” said Mohammed Bayraqdar, a member of the Islam Army’s political oﬃce. “The
role of the Islam Army in all of this is simply to provide security, so that agents of the regime do not inﬁltrate via the
crossing.”
The Cheese King
The trader that Bayraqdar mentioned is Mohieddine Manfoush, also known as Abu Ayman, a little-known local
businessman who has emerged as the most important ﬁgure in the Eastern Ghouta’s siege economy.  Manfoush hails
from a family in Mesraba, southwest of Douma, but although he reportedly still visits the Eastern Ghouta sporadically,
he resides in government-held territory and his oﬃces are in the western suburb of Mezzeh. His family controls the
Manfoush Trading Company, which is a major supplier of cheese, yoghurt, and other dairy products for the markets in
Damascus under the brand name Almarai. The Manfoush family factory is located in Mesraba, and remains in operation
despite the war and the siege.
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According to Youssef Sadaki, who has studied the Eastern Ghouta’s siege economy,  Manfoush began to provide support
for bakeries and bring in wheat to the Eastern Ghouta in 2014, as the government tightened its siege. He later began to
pay stipends to teachers in his hometown, Mesraba, and the nearby village of Medyara. Eventually, he emerged as a
middleman between the rebels and the markets in Damascus, negotiating with Syrian military commanders to take in
truckloads of food, fuel, and other civilian supplies through the Waﬁdeen Crossing, while bringing out his own dairy
products for sale in Damascus. He thus established himself as the most important supplier of basic goods and food for
hundreds of thousands of civilians in the enclave. Sadaki claimed Manfoush has some two thousand employees and has
even set up a force of two hundred armed men to guard his farm and his properties in Mesraba, which seems to have
been spared most of the airstrikes that have devastated other Eastern Ghouta towns. He is now said to be fabulously
rich.
It is not clear who is providing cover for Manfoush’s operations in Damascus, although the government is clearly well
aware of his involvement with its Islamist enemies in the Eastern Ghouta. Given the sensitivity of the issue, there is no
doubt that his business has been approved by very senior ﬁgures in the regime, and it seems likely that they, too, must
beneﬁt ﬁnancially from it.
Whoever his contacts are on the government side, Manfoush has clearly built a strong relationship with the Eastern
Ghouta insurgents as well as with the civilian population, where many reportedly seek his counsel to access services or
other favors. Though these sentiments are perhaps not widely shared in the civilian population, he has been described as
“beloved by both the opposition and regime.”  Some rebels even express surprise at the notion that Manfoush could be
perceived as a progovernment ﬁgure, apparently considering him to be one of their own who just happens to live and
work on the other side. “No, Abu Ayman does not take part in the revolution,” said Wa’el Olwan, the Failaq al-Rahman
spokesperson. “He has continued to work in Damascus and reached a deal between the revolutionaries and the regime.
This allows him to work with both sides and, yeah, of course he makes money from it.”
The Islam Army is at pains to deny that they have any stake in Manfoush’s operations at the Waﬁdeen Crossing, but the
group doesn’t hide that it appreciates his role. “Manfoush does not serve the Islam Army, he serves the Ghouta in its
entirety,” said the Islam Army oﬃcial Mohammed Bayraqdar. “Our interests are in harmony with the interests of the
people and our relationship is merely that of facilitating his services. If there were another person [who performed the
same function], we would provide the same services to him in return for his services to the people of the Ghouta.”
Whatever his motives or the nature of his relationship to the insurgent groups and the Assad regime, all sides seem to
agree that Manfoush has emerged as a major powerbroker in the Eastern Ghouta and that his imports via the Waﬁdeen
Crossing are now crucially important to sustain life in the enclave. Quite possibly, he is now also a person of some
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importance in Damascus, and it seems likely that he could play a signiﬁcant role in future truce negotiations between
rebels and the government, and perhaps also in a postconﬂict settlement. Yet, he has only been mentioned in a small
handful of articles in the Arabic press and hardly at all in English. Indeed, his Waﬁdeen business has gained little
attention even in Syrian opposition publications.
While much therefore remains unknown about his exact role in the Eastern Ghouta’s siege economy, Mohieddine
Manfoush appears as an interesting example of how Syrian entrepreneurs operate in the gray zones of politics and the
war economy, and how they can emerge as powerful actors on the ground without even registering in the politicized
narratives that dominate media coverage of the conﬂict.
The Tunnel Trade
Apart from the Waﬁdeen Crossing, the Eastern Ghouta has been supplied through a system of secret tunnels and semi-
informal frontline crossings. While the crossings can bring in a far greater volume of trade, the tunnels serve to import
goods that are restricted or banned by the government (including fuel, medical supplies, and arms), to move people in
and out of the enclave, and to challenge and undercut food prices set by the Waﬁdeen monopolists. Several diﬀerent
factions have had access to tunnels, but much of the traﬃc has also taken place in collaboration between two or more
groups, sometimes leading to ideologically awkward alliances. Repeated battles between opposition groups erupted from
2014 to 2016 over proﬁt sharing, charges of price dumping, and, more straightforwardly, over who should control which
tunnel. Though the scope of the traﬃc may be less than many would believe, the tunnel trade has therefore emerged as
an emblematic symbol of rebel corruption to many activists in the Eastern Ghouta.
REBELS EXIT A TUNNEL IN THE EASTERN GHOUTA. SOURCE: ORIENT TV.
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It is diﬃcult to get a clear picture of the tunnel trade, since it is both a military secret and a source of some
embarrassment to rebel leaders, while civilian activists tend to avoid the topic for fear of retribution from armed
factions. However, the following, rudimentary description is what has been possible to piece together from interviews
and information collected in Syrian opposition propaganda, online journals, and on social media.
The tunnel trade takes place in the Damascus suburbs on the western and northwestern fringes of the Eastern Ghouta
enclave. After exhausting sieges and years of bombardment, Barzeh and Qaboun, two contiguous neighborhoods located
just west of the enclave, next to Harasta, signed separate truces with the Syrian army in early 2014.  The local rebels
were allowed to retain their arms, surrounded by checkpoints of the army and so-called Reconciliation Committees.
Municipal workers and state representatives are allowed entry under certain conditions, and the army now generally
permits aid deliveries and trade with Damascus proper, though traﬃc is inspected and sometimes blocked.
This situation is unusual. Most of the so-called reconciliation agreements (musalahat) imposed by the Syrian
government on rebel territories have led to the complete dismantling of local insurgent groups and sometimes their
evacuation to other opposition-controlled regions, particularly Idlib. Syria’s Minister of Reconciliation Ali Heidar
describes a phased process, which according to the Syrian government should ideally move from the ending of active
hostilities, to the restoration of services, to full reintegration into the state and government control. In this case, the
process has not been completed: “Sometimes we succeed 100 percent, sometimes we do less well. Barzeh is still at the
second stage of the process, I would say.”
One reason for this slow progress seems to be the relationship between Barzeh and Qaboun and the Eastern Ghouta.
Government oﬃcials, former rebels in the truce areas, and active insurgents in the Eastern Ghouta enclave all proﬁt
from the trade ﬂowing from Damascus through Qaboun and Barzeh to the besieged territory. Though neither side is
truly content with the arrangement, all have a stake in seeing it continue and individual commanders seem to be making
good money from it.
The dividing line between the Eastern Ghouta and the area covered by the Barzeh truce is the Damascus-Homs
highway.  In this area, a major semioﬃcial point of access has been established, variously known as the Zahteh Tunnel,
the Central Tunnel, or the Harasta Crossing. Like the Waﬁdeen Crossing, it allows the Eastern Ghouta to tap into the
markets of Damascus, via the truce zones, though that trade is ultimately regulated and limited by the checkpoints
surrounding Barzeh and Qaboun.
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Starting in 2014, the Eastern Ghouta insurgents also began to dig several smaller smuggling tunnels to Barzeh and
Qaboun, as well as to the semi-isolated frontline neighborhood of Jobar, which juts deep into eastern Damascus. These
tunnels mainly focused on bringing in ammunition, fuel, and other goods restricted by the government, and on moving
wanted individuals and armed units past army checkpoints. Many tunnels have been dug exclusively for military
purposes, but around three or four, aside from the Zahteh Tunnel, are used partly or exclusively for commercial purposes.
In addition, there seem to be smaller routes, perhaps appended to the main ones—descriptions are unclear. Most of the
commercial trade moves along the Harasta-Barzeh route, but tunnels also connect the Eastern Ghouta neighborhoods of
Zamalka and Erbeen to Barzeh and Qaboun, and to the military front in Jobar.
Military-purpose tunnels are occasionally blown up by the government, but civilian trade through the Zahteh Tunnel
and similar routes has faced much less obstruction. Though the government is aware of the tunnels and knows that they
undermine the siege, it seems keen to preserve the Barzeh-Qaboun truce deals. Army and intelligence oﬃcers who
command checkpoints around the truce areas reportedly use their control over the ﬂow of goods to strike deals with
traders, or even negotiate directly with rebel factions on the other side.
Since late 2014, the Zahteh Tunnel and other Harasta routes are under the exclusive control of a group known as the
Fajr al-Umma Brigade. In spring 2014, another tunnel was reportedly dug by Failaq al-Rahman from Erbeen to a Nusra
Front-controlled property in Qaboun. The Nusra Front may then have acquired a separate tunnel in 2015, after tension
with Failaq al-Rahman. The Islam Army has also dug at least two tunnels, linking Zamalka and Erbeen with the
frontline suburb of Jobar and apparently also with Qaboun.
“There are a lot of exaggerations regarding these tunnels,” said Failaq al-Rahman’s Wa’el Olwan, who insists that all
tunnels combined “cannot provide for even 10 percent of the needs of the Ghouta” and that they are insigniﬁcant
compared to the Waﬁdeen Crossing.  Rebel oﬃcials typically claim that their own tunnels are only used for military
logistics, though they readily agree that other factions use theirs for smuggling. For example, an Islamic scholar with
sympathies for the Islam Army insists that its tunnels are not used for commercial activities, except for importing fuel at
a 70 percent discount as a service to civilians.  In practice, however, every major faction in the Eastern Ghouta seems
to have had some stake in the commercial tunneling business.
The Zahteh Tunnel and Fajr al-Umma
The Zahteh Tunnel in Harasta seems to be the primary commercial smuggling route in the Eastern Ghouta, and it is the
one most associated with proﬁteering and factional conﬂict. As with everything related to the smuggling in Eastern
Ghouta, it is diﬃcult to get accurate information on how the tunnel operates and who controls it. The following
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information has been pieced together from a number of sources and testimonies, some of them contradictory, and it
should be treated with care.
Though sources portray it diﬀerently, the Zahteh Tunnel is most often described as a tunnel or underpass that allows
movement beneath the Damascus-Homs highway. It seems likely that it is in fact a preexisting route, though perhaps
physically expanded or reinforced, that only gained its current signiﬁcance after the Barzeh truce opened a possibility of
trade with Damascus in January 2014.
Initially, the Zahteh Tunnel appears to have been controlled by a local Free Syrian Army group known as the Fateh al-
Sham Brigade, which pioneered its use for trade with the armed groups in Barzeh.  Soon, however, the group fell afoul
of the Eastern Ghouta’s internal politics.
In September 2014, the Fateh al-Sham Brigade leader Fahd al-Kurdi took part in the creation of the Umma Army,
perhaps fearing that the growing power of Alloush and the Uniﬁed Military Command would strip him of control over
the Zahteh Tunnel. Kurdi was murdered by unknown assailants the following month. A rival Harasta faction known as
Fajr al-Umma then took advantage of Alloush’s purge of the Umma Army in Douma to move against Fateh al-Sham
Brigade in Harasta. This seems to have involved seizing control of the Zahteh Tunnel. By early 2015, virtually the entire
district was under the sole control of Fajr al-Umma, which began to absorb smaller groups and erected checkpoints
around its territory.
The Fajr al-Umma leader, Abu Khaled al-Daqr, also known as Abu Khaled al-Zahteh, is a local man who rose to power
through the war. He reportedly hails from a poor family, but since establishing himself as “the emir of Harasta” he is said
to have amassed great wealth and developed a measure of popularity in Harasta, where he rules through alliances with
local notables. While hardly a bastion of liberalism, Harasta has long self-identiﬁed as a more secular and freewheeling
place than other localities in the Eastern Ghouta, particularly ultraconservative Douma. Some of Abu Khaled’s popularity
seems to stem from his ability to keep the Islam Army and its Salaﬁ preachers at bay, though religious conservatives and
other critics tend to describe him as an opportunist and a war proﬁteer rather than as a defender of any particular
lifestyle.
He is, in any case, a defender of the Zahteh Tunnel. Having emerged as a primary artery for the Eastern Ghouta’s siege
economy, the tunnel is now so busy that it reportedly runs in triple shifts, transporting food, cigarettes, livestock,
weapons, and even smuggled antiquities. Eastern Ghouta residents who wish to leave the enclave can also use the
tunnel, but only after paying a fee that can amount to hundreds of dollars—reportedly peaking at $1,500 in March 2016,
in a country where the average monthly income is closer to ﬁfty or sixty dollars.  According to one local activist, Abu
Khaled al-Daqr has banned food imports except from selected merchants, from whom he demands a “tunnel tax”
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ranging between 25 and 45 percent of the value of the shipment. The ﬁnal sales price inside the Eastern Ghouta may rise
by several thousand percent over the purchase price in Damascus.  Other factions also pay Abu Khaled for use of the
Zahteh Tunnel and other smuggling routes in Harasta, through which they can get ammunition, fuel, and other goods
necessary for their military preparedness.
Unsurprisingly, Abu Khaled’s tunneling business has drawn the ire of many in the Eastern Ghouta, who accuse him of
usurious practices toward other rebels and proﬁteering at the expense of hungry civilians. But Fajr al-Umma
sympathizers do not seem overly concerned by these accusations. “Regarding the tunnels, we have a right to trade in
order to feed the mujahideen and our revolutionaries after people ganged up on us,” retorted a Harasta-based supporter
of the group.
Fajr al-Umma has its roots in a faction known as the Der’ al-Asima Brigade, which at one point drew support from
individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Under Abu Khaled’s leadership, this group evolved into Fajr al-Umma in
March 2014. At the time, it was presented as a subfaction of the non-Salaﬁ Islamist group Ajnad al-Sham.  However,
Fajr al-Umma seems to be far more invested in its identity as a local force for Harasta than in any particular ideology,
and it has drifted in and out of alliances without much regard for political consistency.  “They always want to be part of
a bigger faction,” said Wa’el Olwan, who, as the spokesperson of Failaq al-Rahman and formerly of Ajnad al-Sham was
allied with Fajr al-Umma in 2014 and again in 2015–16. “It’s because they have an old conﬂict with the Islam Army and
Zahran Alloush was threatening them.”
The origin of Abu Khaled’s conﬂict with Zahran Alloush is related to the Zahteh Tunnel. Both sides accuse the other of
criminality and proﬁteering,  but whoever was at fault, it is clear that the conﬂict had more to do with greed than
creed. “Fajr al-Umma is a populist faction [fasil shaabi],” Olwan said. “They have no ideology. They work in Harasta.
There are some tunnels there and they control them. The tunnels are what gathers the group, not ideology.”
2015: Lead-Up to Conﬂict
Two years into the siege, the economic conditions created by the government blockade had begun to reshape the Eastern
Ghouta’s politics in fundamental ways. Rebel commanders were forced to spend more and more attention on ensuring
access to resources and guarding against threats to their supply lines. Some of them—many, perhaps—were drawn to the
lucrative smuggling economy for purposes that had little to do with the war itself. Meanwhile, the government, too,
began to ﬁnd its bearings and exploit the sources of leverage created by its control over the smuggling trade. For the
Islam Army, 2015 would be a diﬃcult year, ending in disaster.
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As the year began, however, Zahran Alloush seemed more powerful than ever. He had just eliminated the Umma Army
and was now in sole control of the Waﬁdeen Crossing. He had ensured the near-hegemony of the Uniﬁed Military
Command, in which he served as supreme commander. Although Alloush did not have the same strong grip on the
Uniﬁed Judicial Council—which had also been weakened by his unilateral campaign against the Umma Army and the
Islamic State—its courts were now almost universally recognized. Though it was still far from fully functional, a cross-
factional system ﬁnally seemed to be coalescing around the new institutions, with the Islam Army acting as a central
pillar of this new order.
Below the surface, however, the Eastern Ghouta was seething with unrest and resentment against Alloush. The crushing
of the Umma Army and the Islamic State had left a bitter aftertaste, with relatives demonstrating for the release of
Alloush’s prisoners and any number of feuds and vendettas plaguing the enclave. Alloush’s Uniﬁed Military Command
deputies, Yasser al-Qadri of Ajnad al-Sham and Failaq al-Rahman’s Abdel-Nasr Shmeir, wrestled with him for inﬂuence
and tried to push back at the Islam Army through the Uniﬁed Judicial Council, though they now realized that Alloush
could not be bound by it. In Harasta, Abu Khaled al-Daqr’s Fajr al-Umma group was building its own economic empire
on the back of the tunneling business. Last but not least, the Nusra Front remained sullenly hostile to Alloush, his
foreign backers, and the new institutional structure, a looming threat in the background.
The Islam Army also appears to have suﬀered from ﬁnancial and logistical problems. In 2014, the U.S. had pressured
Gulf Arab states to crack down on unregulated private donation networks for the Syrian insurgency. Though this was
primarily aimed at funders of the Nusra Front and the Islamic State, the Kuwaiti Council of Supporters that backed
Alloush had also drawn attention and it and other mainstream Salaﬁ groups gradually ceased most of their public
activity.  The Waﬁdeen Crossing was a potentially very important source of income, but the government had closed it
during the Umma Army clashes in November 2014 and easily could do so again; relying on it would be dangerous.
Perhaps not coincidentally, Alloush’s tunnel operations in the Damascus suburbs began to be targeted in spring 2015 by
the Syrian army (and, according to the Islam Army, also by Fajr al-Umma).  The Islam Army’s ﬁnances reportedly
worsened to the point where Alloush was forced to start borrowing money from local merchants, and in summer 2015
the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi claimed that he was heavily indebted.
Struggle over the Zahteh Tunnel
As he looked for ways to limit the Islam Army’s dependence on the Waﬁdeen Crossing and to regain access to
ammunition, fuel, and other banned goods, Alloush’s gaze fell, of course, on the Zahteh Tunnel. Having secured a near-
monopoly on the Barzeh smuggling, Fajr al-Umma now demanded exorbitant prices from other factions that needed to
bring in food, ammunition, medical supplies, or fuel. Alloush began to press for better terms and, after some minor
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skirmishing, a deal was reached in May 2015 on how to share usage of the tunnel. The Islam Army and Fajr al-Umma
would be allowed exclusive use of the Zahteh Tunnel for ﬁve days each, while the Nusra Front would have four days and
Ajnad al-Sham three. The rest of the month would be shared between civilian organizations and aid groups.
It appears that Abu Khaled al-Daqr never actually planned to abide by the deal, and other factions may have encouraged
him to break the agreement to weaken the Islam Army. But Alloush was a dangerous enemy, and he was getting
desperate. To avoid retribution, Abu Khaled decided to rekindle his lapsed alliance with Ajnad al-Sham, which happily
obliged. The group’s clerics swiftly determined that Abu Khaled had found the straight path of Islam again, meaning that
he was welcome back in the group and that his moneymaking tunnel would now be under their protection.
Looking for Foreign Support
Stumped, Alloush seems to have started to look for support outside the enclave, but this would require some political
concessions. The politics of the rebellion were changing. The rise of the Islamic State and tensions with the Nusra Front
had pushed many otherwise hardline Islamists toward collaboration with the mainstream insurgency, while Saudi Arabia
had thrown its weight behind a U.S.-supported peace process and was calling on its Syrian clients to climb aboard.
Alloush began to draw closer to Western-approved opposition leaders and ended his public ﬂattery of the Nusra Front,
always less heartfelt than it was an attempt to avoid conﬂict. Later in 2015, the Islam Army resumed use of some Free
Syrian Army symbols after a three-year boycott.
In May 2015, the Islam Army leader smuggled himself out of the enclave. He traveled to Turkey where he met some of
his Islamist sponsors as well as foreign diplomats and intelligence services. Also, for the ﬁrst time, he gave interviews to
English-language media, having exchanged his military fatigues for a neat grey suit jacket and appearing as a “model of
pragmatism.” Asked about his condemnations of democracy and non-Sunnis, he explained that these unfortunate
remarks had been the result of “psychological stress.”  After Turkey, he traveled to Jordan, where he reportedly met
with representatives of the United States-backed Military Operations Center.  Whatever else transpired, Alloush’s
meetings abroad seemed to have swayed him in favor of the United Nations-led peace process known as Geneva III,
which took oﬀ a few months later.
During Alloush’s absence from the Eastern Ghouta, there was an upsurge in protests against his rule, no doubt
encouraged by his local rivals. Ajnad al-Sham’s Yasser al-Qadri also brieﬂy tried to claim the position as head of the
Uniﬁed Military Command, but this was quickly forgotten.
As he returned to the enclave, Alloush gave the order to prepare a military solution of the Zahteh problem.“The Islam
117
118
119
120
121
PAGE 35
Army leadership began erecting earth berms around the town of Harasta and they banned people from entering or
exiting,” recalled a media activist friendly with Fajr al-Umma.  “They were arresting whomever they wanted among
Fajr al-Umma’s adherents.”  In August 2015, Alloush sent tanks to the outskirts of Harasta, but he was ﬁnally forced to
back down when Abu Khaled’s allies in Ajnad al-Sham warned that Fajr al-Umma was under their protection. The
Nusra Front and other factions did their best to mediate, and Alloush eventually gave up, apparently ﬁnding the
resistance too great.
Summer Protests
Large-scale violence had been avoided, but the situation in the Eastern Ghouta remained tense. Civilian activists accused
the rebel leaders of ﬁghting more over money than against Assad, attributing their misery not only to the government
siege but also to rebels’ hoarding of food, corruption, and theft. The previously cited London School of Economics report
noted that relations between the armed groups and local residents had at this point, in summer 2015, become “highly
strained.” According to the report:
Citizens told us that they are fed up with the armed groups who coerced the population by manipulating
aid and food supplies in a situation of near starvation. There was widespread resentment at the armed
groups who have enough to feed themselves during a siege, enriching themselves while civilians suﬀer.
This is being expressed overtly through protests. No one participant expressed sympathy with the main
armed groups of Ghouta, although all the participants were very clearly against the government and
many had participated in the early days of the revolution.
All through summer, the enclave was rocked by civilian protests against rebel corruption and abuses, as well as
demonstrations by partisans of one group against another. In June 2015, Failaq al-Rahman ﬁghters had shot and killed
several demonstrators, whose relatives then stormed the home of the group’s leader, Captain Shmeir, and dragged him oﬀ
for trial at the Uniﬁed Judicial Council. Despite its inability to control the competing factions, the council remained the
most important governance body in the enclave. But when asked to punish the leader of one of its most powerful
member factions, the council declined to intervene. Shmeir was quickly released.
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Inevitably, many demonstrators also turned their anger on Alloush.  “Hey Zahran,” read a placard carried by a
demonstrator (see above) in Saqba during a wave of protests against the Islam Army in August 2015, “We don’t want you
to ﬁght your brothers over a tunnel, we want you to ﬁght our enemy above the tunnel!”
Defections from the Joint Institutions
The joint governance institutions painstakingly forged a year earlier now began to come apart. Second-tier rebel factions
had by now come to view them more as a tool for Islam Army hegemony than a system in which they had a meaningful
stake, and after unsuccessfully demanding reforms, they sought to delegitimize the institutions through boycotts.
In July 2015, Ajnad al-Sham’s Khaled Tafour resigned from the presidency of the Uniﬁed Judicial Council as a result of
his increasingly public disagreements with the Islam Army.  The council did not dissolve, but the fact that leadership
fell to the Alloush-friendly cleric Zeinelabidine bin al-Hussein only reinforced the complaints that it was biased in favor
of the Islam Army.
In early August 2015, both Failaq al-Rahman and Ajnad al-Sham reportedly suspended their participation in the Uniﬁed
Military Command.  Alloush was furious. At a meeting with a group of Ghouta notables, he raged against his rivals,
blamed them for all the ills in the enclave, and warned that if they tried to break away it would lead to the unraveling of
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PLACARD HELD BY DEMONSTRATOR IN SAQBA IN AUGUST 2015. SOURCE: ALL4SYRIA.
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the entire administrative apparatus, including courts and police.
For about a year, a string of mysterious assassinations had targeted political and military leaders in the Eastern Ghouta,
most of them critics of the Islam Army. The victims included high-proﬁle ﬁgures, such as the October 2015 killing of
Ahmed Abdelaziz Uyyoun (Abu Shujaa al-Azhari), Khaled Tafour’s predecessor as head of the Uniﬁed Judicial
Council.  Many of these assassinations were thought to be the work of Alloush’s security services, though no one
seemed able to produce tangible evidence. The Islam Army protested its innocence, pointing out—correctly, if insincerely
—that there were plenty of other possible culprits, including the Islamic State, the Syrian government, and foreign
intelligence services.
On September 30, 2015, the Russian air force had begun to strike targets in Syria, reversing the ﬂagging fortunes of
Assad’s government, but the Ghouta rebels were preoccupied by yet another tunnel crisis.  By November, the
government was attacking the southern end of the Ghouta enclave, and in December it captured the Marj al-Sultan Air
Base. The agricultural region around Deir al-Asaﬁr was now at risk of falling, which would spell disaster for the enclave’s
ability to withstand the blockade. It was no time for inﬁghting, yet the leaders of the Eastern Ghouta seemed blind and
deaf to everything except their petty factional feuds.
Ideology and Regional Links
In 2012, the Eastern Ghouta insurgency consisted of dozens of factions. In 2015, mergers and takeovers had reduced
them to ﬁve core blocks: the Islam Army, Ajnad al-Sham, Failaq al-Rahman, the Nusra Front, and Fajr al-Umma. But
ironically, as the insurgency progressed toward what seemed like greater unity, and factions banded together according
to their preferences and interests, the polarization between the blocs grew. Ideological and religious diﬀerences began to
take on new meaning, and political strategies and foreign linkages emerged as serious obstacles to cooperation.
Though many of the conﬂicts between the enclave’s armed factions revolved around mundane matters like access to
money or fuel, political and religious diﬀerences have also played a part and sometimes intensiﬁed rivalries. They are
worth studying in some detail.
Religious and Political Ideology
Three of the major Eastern Ghouta factions adhere to some variety of Salaﬁsm: the Islam Army, the Nusra Front, and
Ahrar al-Sham. To an outsider, they may seem indistinguishable, as all favor the imposition of a Sunni theocracy based
on sharia, are overtly antidemocratic and hostile to Shia minorities and Suﬁs, and often throw around quotes from the
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same scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and Mohammed ibn Abdelwahhab (1703–92). But despite the overlap,
subtle doctrinal diﬀerences and incompatible foreign allegiances divide the Eastern Ghouta’s Salaﬁ camp.
The Islam Army: The Saudi-trained leaders of the Islam Army tend toward so-called “purist” or “scholarly” Salaﬁsm (al-
salaﬁyya al-’ilmiyya), in the tradition of the Syrian-Albanian scholar Mohammed Nasreddine al-Albani (1914–99) and
other such ﬁgures. Normally averse to political action, this strand of Salaﬁsm focuses instead on missionary activity and
on enforcing social norms. It tends to be hostile to both al-Qaeda-style Salaﬁ-jihadism and the reformist activism of the
Muslim Brotherhood, but close to the Saudi religious establishment, though not necessarily to the monarchy. However,
even after excising the jihadist trend, Salaﬁsm can hardly be described as a monolithic movement and its ideological
divides were always very ﬂuid. Alloush’s clerical connections seem to have ranged from politically quietist Saudi
establishment ﬁgures to activist and independent-minded Salaﬁ ideologues, including those in the so-called Surouri
trend.
However, the Islam Army always resisted being labeled an exclusively Salaﬁ organization. “The Islam Brigade [as it was
then called] carries the name of Islam, not the name of any particular school of thought or any particular jihadi line,”
noted Mohammed Alloush, a senior political ﬁgure in the group who was also a close companion and relative of
Zahran.  The Islam Army-friendly Salaﬁ preacher Abu Ammar Hawwa said the group “believes in confessional
pluralism within a Sunni framework” and stressed that though it is largely Salaﬁ, the Islam Army does include non-
Salaﬁ members and even leaders, such as the locally inﬂuential Suﬁ sheikh Said Darwish.
The Nusra Front: The Nusra Front (which renamed itself Fateh al-Sham in July 2016) draws mainly on the teachings of
al-Qaeda-friendly clerics in the so-called Salaﬁ-jihadist trend, an insurrectionist reinterpretation of Salaﬁsm that focuses
on global armed struggle. It is a modern revolutionary ideology that has been shaped by the work of radical thinkers like
Sayyed Qutb (1906–66), Abdullah Azzam (1941–89), Sayyed Imam al-Sharif (1950–), Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi
(1959–), and Abu Qatada al-Falastini (1960–). Mainstream, nonrevolutionary Salaﬁ trends tend to view Salaﬁ-jihadism
as an adventurist diversion at best and at worst a criminal assault on legitimate governments, particularly that of Saudi
Arabia. The disagreement is thus at heart a political one, ﬂowing from contradictory relationships to established
governments of Muslim countries, and to the international system, even as both sides of the argument are keen to dress
it up in religious scripture.
Ahrar al-Sham: The Qatari- and Turkish-backed group Ahrar al-Sham combines aspects of Salaﬁ-jihadism with more
mainstream Islamist views. While many of the group’s founders came from a Salaﬁ-jihadist background, Ahrar al-Sham
diverged from al-Qaeda-style politics early on by stating that its project would be limited to Syria and by seeking
constructive relations with Gulf Arab and other governments that al-Qaeda considers enemies of Islam. When war
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erupted with the Islamic State in 2014, the group’s leadership began to revise its views, draw closer to Free Syrian Army-
style factions, and openly placed itself under Turkish patronage. Some of its chief ideologues publicly rejected Salaﬁ-
jihadism, though others defected in protest against this relative moderation. Since then, the group’s rhetoric has evolved
toward something more resembling a paramilitary Salaﬁ version of the Muslim Brotherhood, with echoes of the style of
jihadism that was more prominent in the 1980s and 1990s. However, al-Qaeda-friendly hardliners remain well
implanted in its ranks and the group is now deeply factionalized.  As has been explained above, much of the Eastern
Ghouta’s Ahrar al-Sham membership joined Failaq al-Rahman or the Islam Army in 2015, leaving only a small rump
faction of hardliners who have opted for a close alliance with the Nusra Front.
Ajnad al-Sham: In contrast to these three, Ajnad al-Sham is not a Salaﬁ organization at all, albeit still Islamist and
committed to some form of sharia-based government. The group was created with support from a powerful cast of
mainstream Damascene clerics, including Suﬁs and others who are hostile to Salaﬁsm on doctrinal grounds. Among
them were some of Syria’s most well-known Islamic leaders, like the brothers Osama and Sariya al-Refai and their Zayd
Group, which, before the war, controlled around thirty Damascene mosques and an enormously inﬂuential charity
network.  On the ground inside the Eastern Ghouta, Ajnad al-Sham has been strongly inﬂuenced by Khaled Tafour, a
Naqshbandi Suﬁ and former preacher of the Hassiba Mosque in Douma.
Many of these clerics had worked within state-approved Islamic institutions before drifting into overt opposition in 2011,
routinely interacting with government oﬃcials and in some cases even meeting with Assad, who sought their support.
For decades, the Assad family has used its control over political life and religious associations to cultivate ties to
conservative but politically pliable traditionalists.  By contrast, Syrian Salaﬁs were largely shut out from state
patronage, both because of oﬃcial distrust and because of the opposition they faced from the traditionalists and Suﬁs
who monopolized oﬃcial institutions. The Salaﬁs were themselves deeply hostile to Suﬁsm and other forms of
traditionalist Islam, and they tended to view these clerics as religiously impure government cronies. In keeping with this
attitude, a Salaﬁ preacher in the Eastern Ghouta described Ajnad al-Sham as being “run by traditional sheikhs who used
to be supporters of Assad as long as he and his father ruled, but who were forced to jump on the bandwagon of the
revolution because they feared that people would otherwise turn away from them.”
Salaﬁs and other rivals have also accused Ajnad al-Sham of serving as a front for the Muslim Brotherhood.  Some
Ajnad al-Sham subfactions were created with Muslim Brotherhood start-up money, but there is otherwise no clear
evidence of an organizational link. However, there is considerable ideological and social overlap, as well as family
connections between senior Ajnad al-Sham and Muslim Brotherhood leaders.  “Ajnad al-Sham stems from Damascus’s
traditional (non-Salaﬁ) Islam, which when it politicizes is virtually indistinguishable from the Muslim Brotherhood,”
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explained Thomas Pierret, an expert on Syrian Islamic politics at the University of Edinburgh. “In the Ghouta, Ajnad al-
Sham have been frequently dubbed ʻIkhwan’ [Brotherhood members] by locals because they look like Ikhwan, speak
like Ikhwan, have leaders with Ikhwan background, etc.”
Failaq al-Rahman: In contrast to the above-mentioned four groups, all of which are explicitly Islamist, Failaq al-
Rahman presents itself as a faction of the Free Syrian Army and seeks to emphasize nationalist and military themes,
albeit still infused with conservative Sunni piety and religious rhetoric. The Failaq al-Rahman leader Abdel-Nasr Shmeir
is neither a scholar nor a student of Islam as his counterparts in the other groups are, but rather a former army captain.
Even so, the group drew on the support of local clerics whenever possible, which made for a certain ideological aﬃnity
with Ajnad al-Sham. Captain Shmeir is married into the family of Abu Rateb Abu Diqqa, a sheikh from Douma, and
Failaq al-Rahman had initially followed a Jobar-based scholar named Riyad al-Khiraqi, or Abu Thabet, who “was clearly
part of traditional religious networks, as opposed to Salaﬁ ones.”  Khiraqi was assassinated in May 2015, reportedly by
the Islamic State.
The Fajr al-Umma brigade: The Harasta-based Fajr al-Umma brigade, ﬁnally, seems to pay little attention to ideology,
though its members are probably close to local traditionalist clerics insofar as they follow any religious school. A Fajr al-
Umma-friendly media activist using the name Ahmed al-Boustani accuses the Islam Army of seeking to impose a “single
way of thinking, namely the Salaﬁ-Wahhabi thinking supported by Saudi Arabia,” which, he argues, “contradicts the
Shami [Syrian or Damascene] Islamic thought that is spread throughout the Ghouta.”  But although such views
dovetail with the traditionalist perspectives promoted by Ajnad al-Sham (of which Fajr al-Umma was originally a part)
the group has never followed a clear ideological path, identifying more with its social and geographic roots in Harasta.
Regionalism in the Eastern Ghouta
The longer the conﬂict has dragged on, the more attention there seems to be to regional tension inside the Eastern
Ghouta. Despite being a small area, some of the towns in the enclave have a distinct identity. In particular, Douma
stands out: it is a large city with a conservative and religious character, a rare stronghold of the Hanbali rite, and it was a
center for Salaﬁ missionary activities even before the war. By contrast, certain Damascus suburbs have clung to a less
religious identity, and recently urbanized or agricultural areas obviously share other traditions than the city.
The only group that wears its geographical origin on its sleeve seems to be Fajr al-Umma, which operates only in
Harasta. But the Islam Army is also seen by some of its rivals as not merely an Islamist group, but speciﬁcally a group
representing the Salaﬁ movement of Douma. That is not to say that it is a clear-cut issue, since many other leading rebels
144
145
146
PAGE 41
also hail from Douma, though generally from non-Salaﬁ families. By contrast, Failaq al-Rahman is best implanted in the
Damascus suburbs, though it is not obvious that this is more than a military coincidence.
Since all rebel groups have expanded to their current size by absorbing smaller bands of ﬁghters, who often fought and
sacriﬁced to seize their own hometown or neighborhood, they are now made up of subfactions that can be intensely
territorial. Indeed, some Syrians make the point that regionalism is mainly an issue among the armed factions. “Not
among the civilians. The civilians all stick together, from Erbeen to Mesraba, Douma, or Harasta,” said the activist Alaa
al-Ahmed, who hails from Douma but now resides in Erbeen. “But it does exist among the military factions and they
plant it in society. It is about trying to cultivate support, regardless about whether we’re talking about the Islam Army,
Failaq al-Rahman, or the Fustat Army. They all want to be the main power in the Ghouta.”
In short, regionalism should not be overstated, but neither can it be discounted as a factor in the Eastern Ghouta’s
politics.
International Support and the Role of the MOC
Religious ideology was never in itself a decisive cause of conﬂict among the Eastern Ghouta’s rebel factions, but it has
colored their political and international aﬃliations, and these seem to have mattered greatly.
The Islam Army: The Islam Army generally appears to be close to Saudi religious oﬃcialdom and has previously
received strong support from Salaﬁ preachers and donors in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  The group may enjoy the favor
of some faction of the Saudi royal family, but it is not fully clear whether or to what extent it has been directly funded or
armed by the Saudi government. In fact, Alloush seems to have cast his net widely and at various points also courted
Qatar-aligned supporters and the Turkish government.
Descriptions of the Islam Army as a mere Saudi proxy therefore appear to be exaggerated, not least because Alloush
could rely on powerful means of self-ﬁnancing through his clerical networks and the Waﬁdeen Crossing. Nevertheless,
there is now undoubtedly some level of coordination with the Saudi government, because “the political alignment is very
close,” according to Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute who works closely with Syrian rebel
factions.
Fajr al-Umma: The epitome of a self-funded faction, Fajr al-Umma’s main source of support is the Zahteh Tunnel. The
group hardly engages in diplomacy or political outreach except to communicate its views about factional inﬁghting in
the Eastern Ghouta, and it is unlikely that it enjoys any meaningful foreign backing. However, the group has aligned
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itself with other groups in ways that may indirectly connect it to foreign interests, including Ajnad al-Sham in 2014 and
2015–16 and the Nusra Front in 2016.
The Nusra Front: Like other al-Qaeda factions, the Nusra Front has largely self-funded its activity through donations
from radical clerics in the Arab Gulf and through the war economy. There are also allegations of Qatari and Turkish
support. Judging by the available evidence, this seems to have come in the form of ransom payments and guns channeled
via its allies in Ahrar al-Sham, who are openly aligned with Qatar and Turkey, but the Nusra Front remains openly
suspicious of and unwilling to work with the governments in Doha and Ankara. The Eastern Ghouta wing of the group
has remained isolated from the larger body and has sought to ﬁnance itself through involvement in the tunnel economy,
working pragmatically with factions like Failaq al-Rahman and Fajr al-Umma to develop its economic infrastructure.
Ahrar al-Sham: Well-connected in the Gulf Salaﬁ environment, Ahrar al-Sham initially relied on private religious
fundraisers, some of them close to al-Qaeda and others in the hands of mainstream Salaﬁ clerics. It also seems to have
received support directly or indirectly from Qatar, particularly from 2013 onward. Since 2014, the group seems to have
grown ﬁrmly dependent on payments and arms deliveries from Qatar and Turkey, which constrains its autonomy. In the
Eastern Ghouta, Ahrar al-Sham has been an insigniﬁcant force since 2015 and it does not appear to ever have had a
major stake in the tunnel economy. This apparent failure to develop an autonomous economic base may be one reason
for its close alignment with the Nusra Front.
Ajnad al-Sham: Ajnad al-Sham also enjoys good ties to Turkey and Qatar, but seems to receive most of its support from
powerful traditionalist Damascene clerics and the Muslim Brotherhood. The group is closely aligned with the Syrian
Islamic Council, a body of pro-opposition clerics that incorporates some of Syria’s most inﬂuential Sunni preachers,
including independent Suﬁs, Muslim Brotherhood members, and so-called Surouris, who espouse a politically activist
form of Salaﬁsm. Its president is Osama al-Refai, an inﬂuential Damascene Suﬁ scholar.
Failaq al-Rahman: As for Failaq al-Rahman, which also refers to the Syrian Islamic Council for religious edicts and
political cues, it is strongly associated with the Free Syrian Army brand.  Many sources, including Lister and a number
of Syrians interviewees, insist that Failaq al-Rahman has been CIA-vetted to allow foreign support from the United
States-backed Military Operations Center in Jordan, known as the MOC. Failaq al-Rahman itself denies this. “We have
sources of support abroad like everyone else,” acknowledged Wa’el Olwan, the Failaq al-Rahman spokesperson, but he
refused to acknowledge any connection to the MOC.  Although many other accounts point to a connection between
Failaq al-Rahman and the MOC, a non-Syrian source with good insight into rebel politics claimed that the MOC has
refrained from supporting any armed group inside the Eastern Ghouta enclave for fear of sparking a destabilizing battle
in the Syrian capital.
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The truth of the matter is hard to pin down, but one possible explanation is that the MOC may have restricted its support
to Failaq al-Rahman sub-branches in the Qalamoun Mountains, while withholding (or sharply limiting) support for the
central leadership in the Eastern Ghouta. This is the view of, among others, the Erbeen-based opposition activist Alaa al-
Ahmed, who asserted that there is “no space for neutral factions” in the Qalamoun, where all groups have been “forced in
under the MOC’s inﬂuence” to combat the Islamic State, even as the MOC has refrained from direct involvement in the
Eastern Ghouta.
Did Alloush Seek Support from the MOC?
As previously mentioned, several sources claim that Zahran Alloush met with Western oﬃcials to investigate the
possibility of being cleared for logistical and ﬁnancial support through the MOC during his trip to Turkey and Jordan
from May to June 2015.
According to a story widely believed among Syrian opposition activists, the Islam Army leader was presented with such
stringent conditions that they eﬀectively amounted to a refusal. Diﬀerent versions of this narrative exist, but all seem to
agree that the Islam Army was told not to destabilize the situation in the capital or shell targets inside Damascus.
Members and supporters of the group have also stated that Alloush was told to release the kidnapped human rights
activist Razan Zeitouneh and the imprisoned Umma Army leader Abu Subhi Taha.  Other rumored conditions include
the dissolution of the Islam Army’s religious leadership (led by Samir Kaakeh), surrendering or destroying the Soviet-
made 9K33 Osa surface-to-air missile systems Alloush had captured from the Syrian government, voicing support for
democracy and minority rights, and even changing the name of the group to something less conspicuously Islamist.
Rumors and rivals may well have embellished the truth, and it is possible that Alloush was simply faced with a laundry
list of complaints rather than an actual negotiation over terms. Whatever the truth of the matter, it seems clear that he
did not bring any new understandings with the MOC back to the enclave, though he seems to have picked up a
considerable amount of cash from other sponsors. The Islam Army’s relationship to the Western-backed support
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structures in Jordan seems to have remained tense, and as rebel inﬁghting peaked in spring 2016, its leaders and
propagandists made harsh verbal attacks on the MOC, accusing it of waging a counter-revolutionary campaign in the
Eastern Ghouta on behalf of the United States, Israel, and even the Assad regime.
Talking Peace and Provoking the Jihadis
After Zahran Alloush took his regional circuit in summer 2015, the Islam Army publicly endorsed the United Nations-
led peace process, known as Geneva III. Failaq al-Rahman and Ajnad al-Sham did the same. Islam Army representatives
then participated in a major opposition meeting in Riyadh in December 2015, in preparation for the talks.
Since the Islam Army was both the largest and the most hawkish Islamist faction to join the peace process, its
participation was a crucial source of legitimacy for the opposition delegation.  It was therefore also seen as a
particularly grave threat by the Nusra Front, which correctly assumed that any agreements in Geneva would come at its
expense.
For this reason and others, tension between the Eastern Ghouta branch of the Nusra Front and the Islam Army rose
steadily in autumn 2015. When information began to trickle out in winter and spring that the Islam Army had facilitated
the visit of a Russian military delegation to Douma to discuss the possibility of a local ceaseﬁre, the Nusra Front and the
Islam Army found themselves on a direct collision course.
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2016: The Breakdown
On Christmas Day 2015, an unmanned drone slowly circled a nondescript, walled-oﬀ compound in the farming areas
east of Hammouriyeh in the central-western part of the Eastern Ghouta enclave, watching and ﬁlming as men entered
and a car slowly rolled past on the road outside. Without warning, a massive explosion tore through the building,
sending a billowing white and brown cloud of smoke into the air.
Later that day, it was conﬁrmed: a precision air strike had killed Zahran Alloush, leader of the Islam Army and supreme
commander of the Eastern Ghouta’s Uniﬁed Military Command.
Opposition media showed Alloush’s body, his face undamaged and seemingly at peace, in a burial shroud. Former rivals
among the rebels hastened to pay their respect to the man they now described as a hero and a martyr, forgetting the
criticism and controversies that had deﬁned their relationship to Alloush when he was alive.
Most early reports spoke of a Russian air strike—President Vladimir Putin’s military intervention was not even three
months old—but the Syrian military high command quickly claimed credit, saying its air force had hit a meeting between
Alloush and commanders from Failaq al-Rahman and Ahrar al-Sham.  Apparently it was a lucky shot: the government
had been told by local informants that militant leaders were in the building, but not that its enemy number one in the
Damascus region would be among them.
The Islam Army quickly announced that Alloush’s longtime deputy, Essam Boueidini, also known as Abu Humam, would
take his place. But it was a heavy blow. Ever since its humble beginnings as the Islam Company in summer and autumn
2011, the group had been synonymous with the charismatic and authoritarian leadership of Zahran Alloush. His friends
and relatives from Douma held key positions in the group, and the politics of the group—and of the entire enclave—had
revolved around him, personally. It was uncertain whether Zahran Alloush could truly be replaced.
Anti-Islam Army Block Formation
“The Islam Army is on a downward spiral, I think,” said a Syrian who is closely involved with the politics of the armed
groups, though he does not belong to one. “A confrontation was foregone conclusion as soon as Zahran died. There was a
power vacuum that Failaq al-Rahman and the Nusra Front will rush to ﬁll. It’s like when a powerful maﬁa don gets killed
and rival families move in to take advantage.”
Indeed, within weeks of Alloush’s passing, the politics of the Eastern Ghouta had turned into a game of musical chairs as
all factions sought to position themselves for the post-Zahran era.
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In February 2016, Ajnad al-Sham announced that all its troops in the Eastern Ghouta would place themselves under the
command of Failaq al-Rahman.  The merger between the Eastern Ghouta’s number-two and -three factions mean that
for the ﬁrst time since 2013 there now existed a more or less evenly matched competitor to the Islam Army. The new
Failaq al-Rahman supergroup was clearly about to mount a challenge to the Islam Army.
Failaq al-Rahman’s decision to buy up Ajnad al-Sham came as a surprise to some. Until Alloush’s death, there had been
“serious discussions to unite Failaq al-Rahman and the Islam Army,” said Islam Army spokesperson Islam Alloush, but
now Failaq al-Rahman instead merged with the Islam Army’s main rival.  The Islam Army and some other sources
claim that this was a result of pressure from the MOC. One source claimed the group had just received an infusion of
funds from the MOC to help it “incorporate smaller groups and getting progressively bigger, challenging the Islam
Army’s dominance.”  Failaq al-Rahman disputes this.
Whatever the case, the merger led to drastic worsening of relations between the rebel groups. The Islam Army claimed
that some members of Ajnad al-Sham had refused the merger with Failaq al-Rahman, preferring to instead join the
Islam Army along with all their equipment. “It is customary in Syria’s military circumstances that when a military
formation joins another one, it will bring its weapons and headquarters with it into the merger,” explained Islam
Alloush.  But Failaq al-Rahman rejected this, claiming that the Islam Army was press-ganging former Ajnad al-Sham
ﬁghters into its ranks.  Conﬂict ﬂared over who should control disputed former Ajnad al-Sham bases in the Douma
area, leading to a tense standoﬀ and tit-for-tat arrests. Neither group was in the mood for compromise, sensing that
what was at stake was the long-term balance of power in the enclave.
In this climate of escalation, another anti-Islam Army alliance was declared. On March 15, 2016, Fajr al-Umma joined
with the Nusra Front in a new coalition called the Fustat Army.  It vowed to confront Assad’s “Crusader-Communist-
Shia alliance,” but its main target was, clearly, the Islam Army.
It was far from clear that the decapitated Islam Army could handle both challengers at once, especially not with Assad’s
forces simultaneously attacking the southern part of the enclave. Air strikes against the southern town of Deir al-Asaﬁr
killed and injured dozens of civilians on March 31, 2016 and, in late April, a two-pronged government oﬀensive came
close to severing the Deir al-Asaﬁr region from the rest of the Eastern Ghouta.
The Islam Army did little to defuse tensions. Zahran Alloush’s successor Essam Boueidini was preoccupied with internal
matters, ceding public space to the group’s head of religious aﬀairs, Samir al-Kaakeh, whose threatening tone and
relentless scolding of rival factions threw fuel on the ﬁre. “We had some minor problems with Zahran Alloush when he
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was alive, but thanks to his charisma he was mostly able to maintain discipline in the Islam Army,” recalled Failaq al-
Rahman’s Wa’el Olwan in an interview in May 2016. “That has changed now. We didn’t see this aggressive rhetoric from
the religious oﬃcials of the Islam Army while he was alive, but now we do.”
The Tafour Aﬀair
On March 28, 2016, a group of masked assailants tried to assassinate Khaled Tafour, the Suﬁ cleric who had served as
the spiritual leader of Ajnad al-Sham and now supported Failaq al-Rahman. The group claimed to have caught one of
the perpetrators, who was interrogated.  In a videotaped testimony released by the group, the prisoner claimed to be
working for a secret Islam Army assassination squad tasked with murdering the Failaq al-Rahman leadership.
The Islam Army immediately denied involvement. Kaakeh called the tape a forgery and Boueidini would later claim the
man had been tortured into making a false confession.  But Failaq al-Rahman and Tafour pressed their case and had a
committee appointed by the now nearly defunct Uniﬁed Judicial Council to investigate the incident. Islam Army loyalists
refused to cooperate, causing the council to ﬁnally break apart.
The clashes escalated sharply in mid-April and Failaq al-Rahman accused the Islam Army of having seized its bases in
Shayfouniyeh on April 18.  But the Islam Army, too, saw itself as a victim of aggression: “Failaq al-Rahman attacked
our headquarters in Zamalka and Erbeen, which prompted our members in other areas to defend themselves,” Islam
Alloush said in an email. “Thus the fuse of war was lit.”
Ghouta Civil War: April 28 to May 25, 2016
On the morning of April 28, 2016, ﬁghters loyal to Failaq al-Rahman and the Fustat Army overran Islam Army positions
in Jisreen, Zamalka, Hammouriyeh, and Ein Terma in a surprise attack. The Islam Army lost several bases, arms caches,
and weapons factories, as well as its two tunnels in Zamalka and Erbeen. Failaq al-Rahman now gained near-complete
dominance over the Damascus suburbs, but the Islam Army quickly countered by rooting out opposition from the
Douma region. An internal frontline emerged in Mesraba, splitting the Eastern Ghouta halfway between the Damascus
suburbs and Douma.
Supporters of the Islam Army were initially bombastic and vowed revenge. “We will exterminate them all!” screamed
Samir Kaakeh in a video-recorded sermon.  But as the days passed and the group realized the extent of its losses, its
oﬃcials became more plaintive, emphasizing themes of betrayal and conspiracies. “What happens in the Eastern Ghouta
is an alliance against the Islam Army between the MOC, represented by Failaq al-Rahman, and al-Qaeda,” said Abul-
Hareth, the Islam Army’s commander in northern Syria, who claimed that the goal of this alliance was “to remove the
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
PAGE 48
Islam Army from Damascus and from the fronts of Damascus.”
Civil society groups and opposition members in other areas of Syria reacted with shock and outrage. Both Failaq al-
Rahman and the Islam Army were conscious of the reputational damage they were suﬀering and that the inﬁghting
might allow Assad to seize territory, but they had irreconcilable views on what a truce should look like.
The Islam Army stressed that a ceaseﬁre would have to involve a return of all property and territories seized since April,
speciﬁcally mentioning the two tunnels in Zamalka and Erbeen, the loss of which had done considerable damage to the
group’s economic and military positions.  By contrast, Failaq al-Rahman and the Fustat Army were seeking to preserve
their territorial gains and wanted to keep the Islam Army weak. The Islam Army had given them no cause for
compassion, and they had every reason to fear that it would seek vengeance if allowed to regain its former strength. “You
can lead water back to its course,” the Failaq al-Rahman member Louai al-Sayyed wrote on May 9, 2016. “But you
cannot make it drinkable.”
Despite these divergent views, an agreement to silence the guns was arrived at within a week of the initial inﬁghting. But
on May 6 and 7 the Islam Army overran the frontline in Mesraba with tanks and BMP armored transports. Its
opponents cried foul and the ﬁghting picked up again.
In the end, it was Bashar al-Assad who brought peace inside the Eastern Ghouta. On May 19, the Deir al-Asaﬁr pocket
crumbled, handing Assad control over around ten towns and villages as well as much of the farmland that had sustained
the Eastern Ghouta during three years of siege.  The Failaq al-Rahman and Islam Army leaderships continued to
blame each other in the media, but the disaster in Deir al-Asaﬁr ﬁnally shamed them into agreement. In the following
days, all factions made good-will gestures such as releasing prisoners.
On May 24 and 25, a Qatari-backed mediation mission led by former Syrian prime minister Riyad Hejab clinched a deal
between Failaq al-Rahman and the Islam Army.  After nearly a month of bloodshed and hundreds of deaths, the
inﬁghting subsided. The Fustat Army had apparently delegated Failaq al-Rahman to negotiate on its behalf and
immediately issued a statement blessing their agreement.
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In the end, it was Bashar al-Assad who brought peace inside the
Eastern Ghouta.
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The Doha deal mandated a ceaseﬁre in the Eastern Ghouta, while also “banning ﬁghting between brothers, releasing
prisoners, opening public roads for civilians, returning civilian property to its owners, and stopping the media incitement
campaigns.” A mediation committee composed of six locally respected civilians in the Eastern Ghouta (some with ties to
the exile opposition) was set up to resolve outstanding issues, including the conﬁscated bases and tunnels.  In late
May, both sides released prisoners and began to dismantle some of their checkpoints, turning Mesraba into a buﬀer zone
between their forces.
However, the military factions refused to cede real power to each other or to any joint committee, and the deal would
therefore never be properly implemented. According to the agreement signed in Doha, “the Eastern Ghouta is a single
entity in terms of geography and population and cannot be divided into areas of inﬂuence.” But in practice, it had
already broken in two. Douma and the rural east of the enclave were now under the exclusive control of the Islam Army,
while the Damascus suburbs south of Mesraba were held by Failaq al-Rahman. The Fustat Army factions also had a
signiﬁcant presence, with Harasta still under exclusive Fajr al-Umma control and a few Nusra Front strongholds
scattered across the suburbs (particularly Hammouriyeh and Jobar) and on the southern frontline.
The political scene reﬂected the military divide on the ground. After the collapse of the Uniﬁed Military Command and
the Uniﬁed Judicial Council, other governance bodies also fell apart. “Even the humanitarian institutions and the
educational institutions have been divided into two,” said the independent opposition activist Alaa al-Ahmed. “We now
have two military councils, one belonging to Failaq al-Rahman and one belonging to the Islam Army. We have some
educational institutions belonging to Failaq al-Rahman and others that belong to the Islam Army, and the provincial
authorities led by Akram Toumeh have also split into two parts.”
A Western-backed civilian provincial governor who, unlike the rebel commanders, had a measure of popular legitimacy
by virtue of having been elected by local activists, Akram Toumeh was widely respected in the enclave. Alongside ﬁve
other notables of similar backgrounds, he had been appointed by the Doha mediators to the committee that would
mediate between the factions. But it was an impossible job. As the civilian institutions splintered, the mediators’
inﬂuence withered, and neither popular sympathy nor electoral legitimacy could restrain the rebel commanders. In July
2016, gunmen belonging to Failaq al-Rahman broke into Toumeh’s oﬃces and beat him. Three months later the
committee wrapped up its work, having made no discernible progress, with Toumeh complaining of abuse and
harassment from Islamists. The Eastern Ghouta remained bitterly divided.
Divided They Fall
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The Syrian government had skillfully exploited the inﬁghting. After collapsing the Deir al-Asaﬁr pocket on May 19, 2016
the army oﬀensive in the southern part of the enclave had at ﬁrst seemed to stall. But it was soon replaced by a new army
oﬀensive launched from the desert areas in the east, blasting its way through weakened Islam Army defenses.
Government media gave large coverage to the victories in the Eastern Ghouta and Bashar al-Assad himself turned up for
a rare photo-op in the Marj area near Deir al-Asaﬁr on June 26, where he broke the Ramadan fast with his troops and
promised more victories.
By the end of July 2016, the government had recaptured Jarba, Bahariya, and Meydaa on the eastern edge of the enclave,
and were moving toward the central areas of the enclave. The collapse of the Western Ghouta rebel stronghold of
Darayya in late August released thousands of government troops for other missions, and that month the Eastern Ghouta
village of Hawsh Nasri fell to Assad’s forces.  Though most of these areas were lightly populated, the loss of food-
producing regions was dangerous and the rebels were suﬀering unsustainable casualty rates.
The Islam Army bore the brunt of the damage, since it was its areas in the east that were being targeted. Leaders of the
group felt that this was a deliberate strategy to exploit their weakened state, and insisted that they could not eﬀectively
defend the enclave as long as Failaq al-Rahman refused to return the arms stockpiles and tunnels it had seized in
April.  Failaq al-Rahman blamed the situation on the Islam Army, claiming that it had refused to remove its
checkpoints so that other factions could go to Douma and the eastern front. But Failaq al-Rahman’s own front lines in
the Damascus suburbs remained mostly calm through the summer, despite pleas from the Islam Army to launch
diversionary actions. For the ﬁrst time in years, the Syrian government was permitting aid convoys to enter the suburbs,
in what seemed like yet another attempt to play the factions oﬀ each other.
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FRONTLINES IN THE EASTERN GHOUTA ENCLAVE, DECEMBER 2015 (LEFT) – JUNE 2016 (RIGHT). SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA
COMMONS.
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September saw continued ﬁghting, and October witnessed the fall of the Eastern Ghouta town of Tell Kurdi. Assad’s
troops were now moving through Reyhani, their sights set on Shayfouniyeh, and beyond that, Douma. It was a dramatic
reversal, practically a collapse. In six months, about a third of the enclave had been recaptured by the Syrian
government. Rebel coordination remained poor—almost nonexistent—and the losses looked likely to continue. Many in
the opposition began to sense defeat approaching.
In October 2016, an opposition negotiator revealed that progovernment delegations from Damascus had visited Douma
four times to discuss a potential ceaseﬁre, though he complained that the government showed little consistency and did
not seem serious about the talks.  A government document listed a ten-man committee that would negotiate a “ﬁnal
agreement to restore normal life in Douma and the Eastern Ghouta,” with Russia as a guarantor for any agreement
reached.  By November, preliminary talks had reportedly also started between the government and residents of Fajr al-
Umma-controlled Harasta.  Failaq al-Rahman’s leaders in the Damascus suburbs seemed unlikely to want to be left
alone to face Assad’s army.
Publicly, the rebel leaders remained bullish about their prospects, refusing any talk of surrender. But the enclave was now
so bitterly divided and leaderless, so outgunned and exhausted, that it was diﬃcult to imagine its defenders holding their
ground through 2017. For the rebels of the Eastern Ghouta, there seemed to be no light at the end of the tunnel.
Conclusion
The uprising in the Eastern Ghouta, which began as a chapter of the Arab revolts of 2011, drew on a preexisting, strong
undercurrent of anti-government sentiment. As in other parts of Syria, a variety of social and political forces responded
to the call for revolution, but religious fundamentalists were powerful from the outset and soon became dominant within
the armed insurgency.
The success of the Islamists is not diﬃcult to understand. They hit the ground running with an experienced and
determined leadership, they embodied ideologies that proved perfectly suited to mobilize ﬁghters in a sectarian civil war,
they were able to tap into well-resourced clerical and mosque networks, and they enjoyed easy access to foreign funding
in the crucial ﬁrst months of the war. By contrast, non-Islamist factions tended to be politically parochial and often
purely personality-based, and they could oﬀer little ideological guidance or spiritual comfort to their community.
Though many such groups would later be empowered by outside funders, thereby ensuring a deep manpower reserve for
the insurgency, they generally lacked the characteristics necessary to shape and control the rebellion.
By early 2012, the Eastern Ghouta insurgency was already under strong Islamist inﬂuence. The Islam Army now
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emerged as the most powerful group in Douma under the forceful personal leadership of Zahran Alloush. The siege
imposed in spring 2013 had paradoxical eﬀects on rebel politics inside the Eastern Ghouta. It weakened the local
insurgency as a whole, but also delineated a smaller political ﬁeld, which the Islam Army could more easily dominate. By
nurturing competition between the rebel factions for scarce resources and a handful of high-value import routes, the
siege also had the dual eﬀect of triggering increased inﬁghting and concentrating power among fewer actors.
This environment allowed Alloush to establish himself as a kingmaker of sorts from 2013 until his death in 2015. By
balancing weaker factions against each other, he was able to secure a dominant role in the Uniﬁed Military Command
and the Uniﬁed Judicial Council, which he helped establish to organize the enclave in summer and autumn 2014. He
then crushed two of the three main sources of resistance to the new order, represented by the Umma Army and the
Islamic State, although he avoided military conﬂict with the third one, al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front. The purges clariﬁed
power relations and brought a rare moment of internal stability, which allowed for Alloush’s continued entrenchment.
While the new institutions were weak and deeply dysfunctional, they seemed like the foundation of a new political
system through which Alloush could credibly bid for a monopoly on force—that is, state-like authority.
However, the struggle for control over smuggling routes—in particular, the Waﬁdeen Crossing and the Zahteh Tunnel—
also engendered destructive new rivalries. Even after gaining the upper hand militarily and politically, Alloush failed to
master the siege economy, which made him vulnerable to subversion by rival commanders who held a stronger stake in
the tunnel business. Alloush had overreached, and by mid-2015, the institutions he had used to fortify his dominance
were falling apart, as rival groups began to boycott them and threatened to defect. The Russian intervention in
September 2015 dramatically raised pressure on the rebels and shattered the stalemate in the Eastern Ghouta, creating
another source of tension.
With the insurgency already under severe pressure and internal conﬂict on the rise, the death of Alloush in December
2015 had a catastrophic impact on the stability of the enclave. Rival factions immediately banded together in counter-
alliances to ﬁll the void, possibly with some foreign encouragement. The emergence of almost evenly matched power
blocs for the ﬁrst time in three years profoundly destabilized the Eastern Ghouta, and within months the enclave had slid
into full-scale civil war.
The violent events of April and May 2016 split the Eastern Ghouta along factional lines, shredded what remained of the
joint institutional apparatus, undercut rebel defenses, and facilitated new oﬀensives by the Assad government. There is
now a strong likelihood that the insurgency in the Eastern Ghouta is going to be defeated, perhaps even as soon as in the
ﬁrst half of 2017.
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The rise and fall of the rebel enclave in the Eastern Ghouta parallels the wider war in Syria. Inside this besieged area,
rebel politics have played out with particular speed and ferocity, but the underlying mechanisms have in many ways been
the same as elsewhere in Syria.
Trapped in its factionalism and internal rivalries, the opposition has failed to ﬁll the vacuum created by the destruction
or withdrawal of the Syrian regime. The rebels’ manifest inability to provide basic governance has made both Syrian and
foreign backers of the uprising recoil from the prospect of a battleﬁeld victory over Assad, who has exploited this
ambiguity to devastating eﬀect.
To be sure, some of the fragmentation and instability in rebel-controlled areas has to do with government bombing, aid
blockages, and political manipulation, but that is not the whole story. From the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) to the Afghan Taliban and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka, history shows that nonstate movements can and often have set up centralized military forces and
organized basic courts and policing (that is, they have created the primary building-blocks of government) despite
extremely adverse conditions. Even in contemporary Syria, this has happened in the areas controlled by the Islamic State
—just not among the Sunni Arab opposition groups that the West has sought to empower.
Realistically speaking, in Syria or in similarly splintered polities, only centrally organized, highly motivated, and
ruthlessly violent factions—typically motivated by strong ideology and ideally with access to reliable funding sources or
outside support—will be able to impose themselves on rivals, gain critical mass and ultimately hegemony, enabling them
to construct a new order from within a factionalized and competitive environment. So it was with the Kurds of Rojava,
and so with Islamic State in eastern Syria, notwithstanding their ideological and other diﬀerences.
When and where Syrian Sunni Arab factions have shown some promise as state-builders—such as Ahrar al-Sham and
the Nusra Front in Idlib, and the Islam Army in the Eastern Ghouta—it is, I believe, because at least some of these
elements have been present. Very likely, therefore, mere bottom-to-top organizing and foreign encouragement for
negotiated mergers cannot overcome divisions on such a scale as those aﬀecting the Syrian opposition. Evenly matched
factions can rarely create functioning alliances; if they do, they do not last long. Indeed, the Syrian war seems to
demonstrate what should have been obvious from the start: fragmented insurgencies do not unite without coercion.
Factbox: Main Rebel Groups in the Eastern Ghouta
Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement:  One of Syria’s largest armed rebel groups, the Salaﬁ-inspired Islamists of Ahrar al-
Sham have only a small presence in the Eastern Ghouta since suﬀering a devastating split in 2015.
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Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union:  A large group created in 2013 with the backing of Suﬁ scholars and other non-Salaﬁ
Islamists from the Damascus region. Led for most of its history by Yasser al-Qadri (Abu Mohammed al-Fateh), under the
inﬂuence of the Douma scholar Khaled Tafour. Widely seen as the second-largest faction in the Eastern Ghouta since
2014, Ajnad al-Sham dissolved its Eastern Ghouta branch and ordered members to join Failaq al-Rahman in February
2016.
Failaq al-Rahman: Considered the third-largest group in the Eastern Ghouta from approximately 2014, Failaq al-
Rahman is aligned with the Free Syrian Army and led by Captain Abdel-Naser Shmeir. It grew in 2015 and greatly
increased its power in early 2016 by absorbing Ajnad al-Sham, thus emerging as a dominant force in the urban, western
part of the enclave.
Fajr al-Umma Brigade: Created in 2014 under the leadership of Abu Khaled al-Daqr, also known as al-Zahteh, Fajr al-
Umma controls the Harasta neighborhood and its proﬁtable smuggling tunnels. Joined the Fustat Army in 2016.
Fustat Army: An alliance of the Nusra Front and the Fajr al-Umma Brigade, created in March 2016.
Islam Army: From at least 2013, this Douma-based Islamist group has been the most powerful group in the Eastern
Ghouta. The Islam Army was created by Zahran Alloush who espoused a version of Salaﬁ Islamism diﬀerent from that of
jihadists like al-Qaeda but close to the oﬃcial doctrines in Saudi Arabia. Alloush was killed in December 2015 and
succeeded by Essam Boueidani.
Islamic State:  An ultraradical al-Qaeda splinter faction, the Islamic State was suppressed by the Islam Army in 2014–15
and never gained a strong foothold in the Eastern Ghouta.
Nusra Front: The Syrian wing of al-Qaeda. In the Eastern Ghouta, the Nusra Front was never one of the larger groups
but inﬂuential nonetheless. Its forces were concentrated in the southern Marj region and in some of the Damascus
suburbs. The Eastern Ghouta branch of the Nusra Front joined the Fustat Army alliance in March 2016. In July 2016,
the Nusra Front changed its name to Fateh al-Sham and claimed to have ended its relationship with al-Qaeda.
Umma Army: An alliance of Free Syrian Army groups and local smugglers formed in late 2014 to check the growing
power of the Islam Army, led by Douma rebels Abu Ali Khibbiyeh and Abu Subhi Taha. The group was crushed by the
Islam Army in early 2015.
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state collapse. The project documents some of the spaces where change is still emerging, as well as the dynamic forces
arrayed against it. The collected essays will be published by TCF Press in June 2017.
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